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Introduction  
By Edgar Gutiérrez* 
 
uatemala is Central America’s most populous country and its largest economy. 
But an intransigent elite, an ambitious military and a weak state has opened the 
way for organized crime to flourish, especially since the return of democracy. 
During three decades of democratic rule since 1985, the longest such period in 
Guatemala's history, economic elites have sought to gain hegemonic control. In doing so 
they have tried to exercise power that is not sustained by military force, but rather by 
legitimacy and consensus, at least among the diverse group of elites who share power. 
Historically, there were two prominent power actors: ideologically conservative 
businessmen and high-ranking military officials from the middle classes who derived 
their influence by maintaining the army as an institution of social and political control. 
The political parties distinguished themselves between those that mobilized the social 
base to gain power and those who opposed them while at a disadvantage and under 
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persecution. In contrast, almost all popular movements were opposed to the power 
groups, or openly challenged the established political system. Some of these popular 
movements eventually formed the core of insurgent groups which fought with the state 
between 1960 and 1996 in a brutal civil war that left more than 200,000 dead and 
70,000 disappeared. 
Throughout, elites have remained central actors in Guatemalan politics, as their 
economic power is based on their influence within political circles. They employ diverse 
mechanisms -- formal and informal -- to influence public policy. They can differ in their 
interests, values and functions, and operate on an unequal plane of power relations, 
being simultaneously in conflict with and dependent on society. These actors exercise 
autonomy and can formulate as well as carry out projects at the local and national level. 
Elites in Guatemala 
Despite their dependence on foreign commerce, economic elites in Guatemala managed 
to create a closed culture, avoiding the outside world and its modern tendencies. They 
trusted that their control over large tracts of fertile land and the certainty of counting on 
seasonal farm workers, in addition to the subordinated political regime that provided 
them physical security and potential financial benefits -- credit, tax exonerations, and 
tariff protections -- were sufficient to preserve their power, peace, and well-being. 
The coming of modernity, therefore, was undesirable. The elites largely ignored it in 
order to minimize the effects on the gears of the well-oiled machine they had 
constructed. They imposed a defensive and conservative mentality that eventually 
defeated the reformist regime of Jacobo Árbenz. Árbenz had become president in 1951 
amidst a wave of discontent and had tried to open the political process and institute a 
controversial land reform. His so-called October Revolution implemented mandatory 
wages for farm workers, social security and the limited repartition of land, changes that 
have been diluted by subsequent administrations. Although the elites could not 
immediately repeal some of the October Revolution policies, they joined the United 
States government and conservative military forces in fostering a coup that removed 
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Árbenz in 1954. Despite these efforts to resist change, however, the world was becoming 
irrepressibly bigger and more complex.  
Import substitution policies implemented during the 1960s and 1970s created a new 
social ladder. The stimulus generated in the middle of the 20th century by new 
agricultural products for sale in foreign markets expanded the traditional closed circles 
of economic power. The enlargement of the agricultural sector, as well as the promotion 
of cooperatives linked to export goods and the introduction of chemical fertilizers in the 
farming economy did not represent so much a threat to power or a change in the rules. 
But it did alleviate pressure on the land, encourage small surpluses, and provide jobs for 
an emerging rural middle class. Some members of this new middle class belonged to the 
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civil and military bureaucracy, or were descendants of prosperous indigenous 
merchants from the northwest and from the states of Alta Verapaz and Petén. 
At the same time, Guatemalan economic actors were severely affected by abrupt changes 
in the global economy. The economic elites learned -- at a high cost -- to insert their 
businesses into the global economy, put their investments in several countries and 
vertically integrate their local production chain. 
It is only with this backdrop that we can analyze the slow transition process of 
Guatemala's economic elites during the second half of the 20th century. In the economic 
realm, this transition occurred where traditional plantations lost importance and 
leaders of the agriculture industry lost political weight. In the political realm, the 
transition saw the introduction of more democratic rule and the promotion of civil 
liberties as a condition of international legitimacy in a market economy. And in the 
domestic and international cultural setting, media exposure and new conditions for 
economic competition -- including the formation of human capital and modern 
infrastructure -- became unavoidable challenges for the reproduction and consolidation 
of the principal economic actors. 
Corporations now represent Guatemala’s oligarchy, and this is where old surnames from 
the end of the 19th century are mixed with the modern families that emerged with the 
industrialization policies of the 1950s. These entities, which also control some 90 
percent of the banking sector, represent around 10 percent of Guatemala's gross 
domestic product, but their power has been translated into control over mass media, the 
hiring of lobbying firms in the United States and Europe, the organization of private 
security and intelligence, or espionage, offices, as well as extensive influence in the court 
system and the federal government. 
In tandem but independent of this group, new fortunes have surfaced whose origin is -- 
as it had been with families of the traditional elite -- related to government. A third 
group has emerged around trade and non-traditional exports, tourism, and contraband. 
Some of the members are second-generation families that fell into bankruptcy in the 
1980s and others are first-generation middle-aged business people between 40 and 50 
years old. Finally, the power of the cooperatives is represented by the National Coffee 
Growers Association (Asociación Nacional de Cafeteros - Anacafé) and the Rural 
Development Bank (Banco de Desarrollo Rural - Banrural) with 16,000 investors that 
include cooperatives, indigenous capital, women, nongovernmental organizations and 
micro and small businesses. The cooperative sector has the most extensive physical 
presence in the country and now successfully competes with the traditional banking 
sector. 
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In her renowned investigation Lineage and Racism, Marta Casaus demonstrated how 
dominant family groups have preserved their power since the beginning of the 
Republic.1 The entrance of the emergent sectors during the 20th century was realized 
through a marriage of convenience among aristocratic families. It involved a mechanism 
of mutual assimilation that permitted the closure and control of the elites’ circle. 
Of course, there were always dissident interests and attempts by dissident interests to 
break up the established order by leveraging state power. This is what happened at both 
the beginning and at the end of the period of military government from 1970 to 1982. A 
family-economic group close to President Carlos Arana Osorio (1970-1974) tried, 
unsuccessfully, to break up the beer and cement monopolies by attempting to build its 
own plants, which caused a small war that went beyond finances to include coercion and 
violent attacks. Another group tried to do something similar under the presidency of 
Romeo Lucas García (1978-1982) in the agro-export cotton sector and the promotion of 
large public infrastructure projects that contributed to the deepening economic isolation 
of the regime. Lucas García was finally deposed via a coup d’état, and repudiated by the 
population for his administration's efforts to regain power via electoral fraud. 
The realignment period of 1982 to 1985 saw the transition to a democratic regime. The 
United States proposed via the Caribbean Basin Initiative an alternative process for 
reviving the local economy, as well as offering a platform to dispute power, beyond the 
military, to keep the “communist threat” at bay. This process again tested the political 
power of the economic elite. 
The so-called “communist threat” helped to solidify the last line of defense. Guatemalan 
guerrilla groups, as well neighboring insurgencies, awakened a sense of self-
preservation that was placed above the squabbles and conflicting interests of economic 
groups that arose out of the economic diversification and narrowing social stratification 
during these three decades; thirty years that saw appreciable and sustained economic 
growth, the growth of the middle class and of urban centers. 
Based on anti-communist principles that rejected the totalitarian state model, 
Guatemala's economic elites embraced with great ease the package of ideological 
principles that emerged as the winner of the Cold War: neoliberalism. But they 
embraced a primitive and closed version known as the Austrian School. The University 
of Francisco Marroquín, founded in 1971, and its associated think tank, the Center for 
Social-Economic Studies (Centro de Estudios Económico-Sociales - CEES), led this 
metamorphosis and were home to the most conspicuous anticommunist-neoliberals of 
the era.  
Economic actors are ubiquitous in the political realm. They are interchangeably 
represented by corporations, family organizations and interest groups, but also via their 
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associations with politicians and business alliances. This includes employers' 
associations or coalitions, with the prototypical example being the Coordinating 
Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (Comité 
de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras - CACIF). The first 
constitute informal pressure groups, or networks, that manage private interests within 
the state, while the associations are formal lobbying groups representing business or 
union interests. The takeover of mass media has been another means of control 
acquired in recent years with the emergence of a group of ideologically neoconservative 
activists that produce brochures, booklets, television and radio programs, and even give 
lectures at universities. 
What’s left are two principal ways to influence policy and maintain the status quo. 
1) Direct-Action Networks 
CACIF is the de facto political party of Guatemala's economic elites. It is a hierarchical 
organization, well organized, conservative but flexible, and increasingly sophisticated -- 
an organic class apparatus in the classic sense of the term -- which is currently under the 
control of technocrats. It unites the most important economic actors via a permanent 
assembly of presidents and is capable of integrating, via informal mechanisms, the 
heads of consortia and family groups with significant weight in a variety of economic 
sectors.  
CACIF has managed, with relative success, the “principled” battles of its associates, 
always having as its favorite target the fiscal policies of the government and official 
corruption. It essentially exerts a veto power on undesirable economic policies. That's 
why CACIF takes on a visible and belligerent role in times of conflict, most notably 
during administrations in which the institutionalized economic agents lose influence. 
This is what happened during the rule of the Christian Democratic Party (1986-1991) 
and the Guatemalan Republican Front (2000-2004), in addition to other critical 
junctures.2 
CACIF also closely guards its public image. It nurtures a perception of cohesion -- not 
always based in reality -- and of inclusion among the large consortia. No important 
economic agent would contradict CACIF in public. 
2) Informal Networks 
During every presidential administration, the traditional and emerging elites who have 
converted into lobbying groups -- which can be comprised of families or business 
alliances -- seek protectionist policies and other advantages that would provide them 
greater business opportunities. They do this by financing electoral campaigns in order to 
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later have access to the highest level officials. This is also done by selecting a 
representative within the economic and financial ministries of the central government. 
As a general rule, for example, for the past two decades of democratic rule the salaries of 
top-level public servants have been notably inferior to those of top executives in the 
private sector -- by a ratio of 1:3. The income of ministers is subsidized via bonuses 
known crudely as “dobletes” and paid by the business alliances. In some cases, the 
ministers are paid directly by the large corporations. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
said ministers are always available via phone, or in person, for those who are really 
paying their salary and that these ministers make fulfilling their patrons’ requests a high 
priority. The loyalty of politicians is controlled via this redistribution of income and -- 
once they have left their government post -- by guarantees of social and economic 
reinsertion into the businesses that supported them, perhaps even enjoying greater 
perks and shares in corporate stocks. 
Control of government entities and regulatory agencies, such as the ports and the tax 
agency, is also at the discretion of the president and the economic and public finance 
ministers. The president even has decision-making power -- via a constitutional decree -
- to exonerate taxpayers that are late in making their payments.3 
This type of arbitrary manipulation and influence over market forces -- which extends to 
licenses, privatizations, concessions, usufructs, tax exonerations and more -- has had 
profound social effects. It has led to the bankrupting of small wheat and potato 
producers and the chronically precarious situation of some 2 million corn farmers. It 
also limits market diversification, giving rise to monopolies and oligopolies. 
This is how Guatemala's economic elites, despite what some analysts say, have had a 
decisive influence over public policy priorities and in the overall evaluation of 
government management during democratic rule, from 1985 to the present. In addition 
to their traditional economic power, prolonged during this period via the control of 
strategic public services, these business people, almost exclusively men, have learned to 
utilize political structures and ideological principle to their advantage, especially during 
periods of political realignment and capital accumulation. However, these principles 
and political power rarely work in favor of the common good or contribute to national 
development. 
The Guatemalan State 
During the 20th century, the public sector had been an important mechanism for upward 
social mobility among the urban middle class in the capital and in the provinces. 
Beginning in the 1950s, acceptance into the army, teaching, or any government 
institution -- social security, the ministry of health and finance, the electricity institute, 
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etc. -- equaled job security. The jobs provided a professional career, guaranteed benefits 
and a peaceful retirement. This, in turn, permitted expectations of supporting a family, 
education and even higher expectations of social mobility for the next generation, 
including the creation of savings. It created, for some, a modest “welfare state.” 
But the state's fragility remained throughout and even deepened during the democratic 
period (1986-2016). This phenomenon must be understood in the broader context. It 
resulted from the difficulties of structural adaptation in the face of the demands of a 
post-Cold War democracy and the challenges of globalization. And, in the Guatemalan 
context, the development of the state was further hampered by the fact that the state’s 
very 19th century foundation was as a centrist oligarchy resistant to modern democratic 
reforms. 
Indeed, the power relations that manifest themselves among the elites with respect to 
the Guatemalan state cannot be understood without examining the fragility of the state 
itself. In addition to the gradual loss of authority over society and the precariousness of 
its fiscal and institutional base, limited capacity to provide security and basic services, 
the state is sabotaged by corruption via influence peddling and openly corrupt practices. 
The result is that the state apparatus in Guatemala is suffering a degenerative process, 
despite a favorable environment in which it has enjoyed the longest period of 
democratic rule in its history.4 The state has suffered an erosion of essential capacities 
like guarantees of legal certainty, physical security and the production of other vital 
public goods. 
This process accelerated at the beginning of the 1990s with the assimilation of the 
principles embodied in the Washington Consensus. The transformation from anti-
communism to neo-liberalism required few concessions from the economic elites. The 
highly centralized Guatemalan state operated under a system of clientelism with 
institutionalized corruption and racism. It was socially ineffective but extremely brutal 
and repressive, and it did not enjoy the esteem of society. That is why any private sector 
crusade against the state -- above all, the opposition to attempts to reform the tax 
system -- has enjoyed popular support and has mostly succeeded in undermining these 
government efforts. 
The neoliberal paradigm gave to the state apparatus functions that impeded it from 
becoming a mechanism of social mobility for the middle classes during the democratic 
transition that began in the mid-1980s. The expectations of the democratic state 
aroused a kind of social schizophrenia: it demanded solutions to important issues, but at 
the same time there was a reluctance to pay taxes. The new business models coexist with 
the old bureaucratic style, which is now marginalized among the strategic tasks. The 
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discrediting and demoralization of state employees are deepening the isolation of the 
institutions and hamper efforts at comprehensive reform. 
The most serious illustrations of state fragility in the context of corruption and 
insecurity are: 
1. The loss of monopoly on coercive power and the use of force, which is associated with 
high levels of violence and the subtle relegation of authority in almost 50 percent of the 
national territory. 
2. The limited scope of public policies and loss of regulatory capacity over the private 
sector, both in terms of security and social policies, which is associated with a weak tax 
system. As a consequence, this produced a lower quality bureaucracy and 
institutionalized corruption and uncontrolled discretionary spending, as well as a lack of 
continuity due to a change in administrations every four years. 
3. Porous institutions and legislation regarding the economic interest groups that 
control strategic sectors of the economy and impede the diversification of the market by 
limiting competition. 
The Political System 
The nature of the Guatemalan state in the democratic period must also be understood 
by the limited ability of political parties and their leaders to manage the transition from 
the old economic models to modern ones. The lack of long-term accords has impeded 
the formation of stable political coalitions. No political ideology, party or movement has 
won reelection to the country's highest office in over 30 years. 
This constant alternation of power has conspired against the continuity of basic public 
policies. In part due to this phenomenon, the education system -- the foundation for 
allowing citizens to live in a modern society -- has not been reformed during the 
democratic period. Moreover, there is still no legal certainty for the population or for 
investments, and the tax system remains stuck in a morass. As a result, democracy has 
not been able to generate political parties or social movements that take root at the 
national level.5 
The fragmentation of democratic politics facilitated the rapid repositioning of the old 
business powers. The first institutional failure by a politician, Jorge Serrano's coup 
d'etat in May 1993, gave the impression that the acrimonious worker-management 
disputes had been displaced from the gravitational center of social unrest. Economic 
elites had little difficulty taking over an ample coalition of civil society that, by claiming 
the defense of freedom, was key to thwarting the coup. This was the first test of the 
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hegemony of the economic elites in civil society during the post-Cold War transition 
period, and the elites showed they still held a clear advantage.6 As we will see in our case 
studies, other challenges to the status quo were met with similar strong responses by 
these elites. 
Organized Crime in Guatemala 
The evolution of organized crime in Guatemala must be put in the context of three 
overarching characteristics of the country. 
1. Guatemala is one of the smallest countries on the continent (109,000 square 
kilometers). It has had a long, difficult history: a prolonged and violent 200-year 
experience with colonization; a permanent regime of dispossession and expropriation of 
indigenous communities; structural violence organized as political violence and civil war 
between 1954 and 1996, which has continued as rampant criminal violence in the 
democratic and post-conflict period; and one of the most unequal societies in the 
hemisphere with extremely high rates of child malnutrition and poverty.  
2. The 20th was a lost century for Guatemala, in that the country failed to build state 
institutions. During this period, a strong military power inhibited the development of 
the state. There was also more than a decade during which the end of the civil war was 
not formalized. This led to idle security apparatuses that obeyed certain clandestine 
interests and diverted into criminal activities. As a result, competent and trained 
individuals with significant official status were able to weave together criminal 
organizations and partner with transnational crime. 
3. Under these conditions, reforms to Guatemala’s security and judicial system included 
in the 1996 Peace Accords that followed the country’s civil conflict failed. The country’s 
traditional military power was ultimately weakened, and the National Civil Police and 
other investigative bodies were taken over by private networks, both legal and illegal, 
which sabotaged their ability to impose the rule of law. An estimated 80 percent of 
police are now considered unreliable. The homicide rate in Guatemala City hovers close 
to 90 per 100,000, one of the highest in the world, and impunity for violent crimes 
stands at 98 percent.7 Two-thirds of Guatemala’s adult male population carry firearms, 
and applications for gun licenses from women are growing. In short, the country is 
overwhelmed by criminal violence and citizen self-defense, which includes routine 
instances of vigilantism in vulnerable neighborhoods, the lynching of suspected 
criminals, and the widespread use of hired killers. 
The principal failure with respect to reforms is found within the security and justice 
institutions, since physical and legal insecurity characterize the general fragility of the 
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state. During the period of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and political 
peace (1985 – 1996), clandestine operations of remnant security structures infiltrated 
civil institutions and contaminated the system. This period coincided with the growth 
and formation of the regional drug trade, which transformed Guatemala into a strategic 
link for access to the major drug markets of North America. 
Corruption in Guatemala also became more unconventional during the period of 
democratization. As state institutions neglected internal processes of organization and 
management, they failed to complete -- in terms of bureaucratic modernization -- the 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Nor did initial economic reforms 
launched in the mid-1990s result in greater efficiency. These incomplete reforms gave 
way to serious distortions and administrative disorder, which in turn negatively 
impacted the quality of public expenditure. Consequently, the social legitimacy of the 
state was damaged. 
Drug Trafficking in Guatemala 
In recent years, drug trafficking has represented the most powerful form of organized 
crime in terms of the volume of money involved. This goes beyond crime,8 as drug 
activity absorbs political and security resources, inoculates the formal economy 
(financial, agricultural, and real estate), and has international implications -- above all 
by affecting relations with the United States. Two main drug groups are based in 
Guatemala’s eastern departments of Zacapa and Izabal, and several splinter factions 
maintain links with the Sinaloa Cartel. There are also emerging groups led by Mexican 
organizations like the Zetas.  
Roughly 90 percent of cocaine consumed in the United States transits Guatemala, but 
only about 0.5 percent of that is seized during periods of heightened counternarcotics 
efforts.9 Drug trafficking funds political campaigns at both the local (mayors, deputies) 
and national (presidents, courts, legislators) levels. It also co-opts military officials 
located in strategic trafficking zones and police structures to the point of becoming an 
insecurity factor for drug traffickers themselves. Police groups have been known to steal 
drug shipments and sell them to the highest bidder at the Guatemala-Mexico border. 
Guatemala started becoming a drug corridor in the early 1960s. At the time, Miami was 
the main gateway for drugs entering the United States, with cocaine passing through the 
US ports hidden in containers of fruit, vegetables and shrimp. In those early days, the 
drug trade was essentially controlled by Cuban exiles living in Miami and Guatemala. In 
Guatemala, these traffickers had the backing of the local army and certain anti-Castro 
Guatemalan businessmen. Although the drug trade in those years was of a much smaller 
scale than the massive volumes seen today, it was large enough for local Guatemalan 
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and Cuban businesses to capitalize on. By the 1970s they were out of the drug business 
and expanding their shrimp business, cotton crops or diversifying into heavy industry 
and banking. 
The rise of drug trafficking 
changed entirely the 
conventional parameters of 
corruption. Weak or nonexistent 
election campaign finance 
controls, as well as the loss of 
tradition and partisan loyalty, 
opened the doors to criminal 
influence in Guatemala’s new 
democratic government. This 
porosity went beyond 
Guatemala’s security and justice 
bodies, spreading to the 
government’s procurement and 
contracting system. And, as the 
independence and fiscal 
autonomy of municipal 
governments increased, the 
caudillos and drug traffickers 
exercised a much more direct 
and almost total control over 
local and regional powers. 
The flip side of this coin was the aforementioned ideological and media offensive waged 
by traditional business groups -- organized as lobbyists with remarkable clout -- against 
the idea of regulatory intervention in the market and the strengthening of the attorney 
general. The effect of this was a weakening of public service morale and, therefore, a 
further opening in the level of distrust between society and the state. Thus, personal 
aspirations for accomplishment and professional prestige could hardly be found through 
a career in public service. 
The contradiction of a state charged with formidable social tasks but denied tax 
revenues at the same time became the norm. After benefiting from incentive policies in 
the late 19th century, large corporations have no direct interest in public spending, but 
they are interested in the laws that regulate market competition and allow for 
concessions. Their control via agents and intermediaries over the offices that regulate 
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trade and establish market rules creates another complex picture of corruption, one that 
has been called “the take-over of the state.” 
The Emergence of the CIACS 
Within this context, after the mid-1980s and in the heat of Central America’s civil wars, 
drug trafficking fully established itself in the area and began to take off. Corrupt 
criminal networks emerged during Guatemala’s civil war, especially during its latter 
years. Forming these networks were senior officers and mid-ranking elements of the 
security forces who partnered with the country’s rising aristocratic business class and 
emerging capitalists. The outcomes of these networks were not uniform. Some 
administer large estates or are minority shareholders in companies. In others, second 
generation descendants inherited contraband and smuggling networks -- such as 
controlling the customs office -- or became the basis of drug cartels. 
But the real seed of drug trafficking survived and flourished during the period when 
peace was being constructed in the region. The demobilization of large military 
contingents in Guatemala included the Interior Police, responsible for controlling 
contraband smuggling along land borders, and the Mobile Military Police, an elite unit 
that provided security services to private companies. The failure to insert these groups 
into productive post-conflict activities left an army of unemployed security service 
workers. Many were recruited by Colombian criminal organizations, and later Mexican 
groups, in need of protection and operatives. 
The security system also suffered at the hands of military intelligence officers who had 
been forced out of the army for misconduct and then joined the new National Civil 
Police (Policía Nacional Civil). Altogether, there was a mix of three factors: unemployed 
soldiers; a police force overtaken by corrupt officers; and Colombian criminal 
organizations with "visas" to conduct business with the leaders of local security forces. 
The cartels had already begun installing the import/export front companies they needed 
to provide logistical support for drug trafficking, and they had business connections for 
money laundering. All these factors converged in support of the underworld’s interests. 
It is therefore no coincidence the major drug kingpins of Guatemala were previously 
treasury police (Guardias de Hacienda), commissioned military officers, 
counterintelligence agents, or high-ranking officials. Arnoldo Vargas, for example, the 
first big-time drug trafficker extradited to the United States in December 1990, had been 
a police officer, and was on the path to a successful political career -- he was elected 
mayor of Zacapa, the municipality in the eastern state of the same name. 
But there was also a military structure that operated as a pseudo-paramilitary force. 
This network, which had an extended territorial reach and was an extremely effective 
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force, is known as the Military Counterintelligence Service (Dirección General de 
Contrainteligencia Militar - DGCIM). The DGCIM became autonomous with the end of 
the civil war and moved to capture the spoils of war. It continued to carry out the wishes 
of individuals to eliminate alleged criminals such as robbers and horse thieves, but also 
took the initiative to organize rings that engaged in kidnapping, extortion and car theft. 
Subsequently, these bodies -- which had military discipline and organization, as well as 
knowledge of local terrain and networks within state security structures -- took on 
operations for drug cartels and private security firms. They also worked with groups that 
had developed operational intelligence capabilities to serve their own purposes. 
Eventually, these groups became so well defined they were given a name: the “Illegal 
Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de 
Seguridad - CIACS). Many of these CIACS were forged by blood pacts during the most 
intense military and police operations against insurgents at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Since their formation, the CIACS have been responsible for numerous executions and 
threats, as well as the systematic blocking of investigations by the Attorney General's 
Office, known in Guatemala as the Public Ministry. One of the CIACS, known as the “La 
Oficinita,” has operated from within the Public Ministry since 1997. These shadowy 
groups also have been able to prevent certain cases from reaching trial. A powerful cloak 
of concealment within the key security institutions enabled them to weave a network of 
near complete impunity. As we will see in one of our Guatemala case studies, the CIACS 
are what raised the alarm and spurred the creation of the United Nations-backed 
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional 
Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG)  in 2007. 
Over time, the CIACS have taken on various functions. Some are permanent and have 
legal status, but they can also commit illegal acts and operate clandestinely. Others form 
parts of complex structures that have longer-range objectives, and are of a political or 
business nature. In these organizations the CIACS constitute the armed and intelligence 
wings, essentially replicating the state apparatus in miniature. There are still others that 
are extremely flexible; they band together to complete certain tasks and then 
immediately dissolve. They are not permanent and their members sometimes switch 
ranks. 
The most powerful CIACS are without a doubt those that are associated with organized 
crime groups and those that have started private corporations. Those associated with 
organized crime have taken root in local government, while those aligned with 
corporations have branched off into various institutions within the central government 
and civil entities. The CIACS are a kind of Sicilian-style mafia in the sense that they 
thrive off the weakness of state institutions, they are at the service of both licit and illicit 
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private interests, they provide security, and they arrange contracts or eliminate 
competition. They are always, however, jealously keeping watch over their principal 
task: to produce impunity by maintaining a gelatin state that can be malleable but 
gradually returns to its initial structure despite repeated efforts at reform and 
modernization over a period of almost 25 years. 
Other Criminal Networks 
Human trafficking is a centralized and growing criminal activity with global 
connections, more diverse and far-reaching than those of drug trafficking. These 
traffickers maintain operational contacts throughout the Americas, Europe, and various 
countries of Africa and Asia, including the Middle and Far East. Its activities include 
trafficking in undocumented migrants from Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and other countries outside the region and the international adoption of 
children to the US and Europe. They work through networks of lawyers and justice 
officials. Guatemala was, until recently, the largest per capita exporter of adopted 
children and the second biggest by volume, behind only China. Guatemalan crime 
networks engaged in human and migrant trafficking also sell passports, identity cards, 
licenses and even birth certificates for illegal use, meaning that Nigerians, Chinese, 
Ecuadorans, Colombians, Syrians and others pass through migratory controls in Europe 
and North America with Guatemalan documentation. The basic controls of this illegal 
business are within the Migration Office (Dirección de Migración) and the security 
subsystems of companies contracted to make these personal identity documents. 
Arms trafficking is also a business bringing together networks that perform various 
functions. One of these functions is to serve Guatemala’s domestic market, which is 
comprised of drug cartels, criminal elements -- kidnappers, assassins, muggers and 
street gangs -- security companies, which outnumber the police by a factor of five, and 
even corporations. Another is the re-export of arms to rebel groups, cartels and mafias 
in other countries, especially in South America. One goal of these arms trafficking 
networks -- hastened by heightened arms restrictions -- is to legalize their income and 
assets, which makes it essential to control the weapons registry office within 
Guatemala’s Interior Ministry. 
Contraband networks are the oldest criminal networks, emerging in 1970 after the army 
took over the customs office on the premise of controlling arms trafficking to leftist 
guerrillas. Civilians within the armed forces, including specialists and customs 
employees, became the base of extensive smuggling networks which both colluded and 
competed with import businesses. There are strong links between customs agents and 
military and political networks, as well as various local and foreign trading 
communities, Middle Eastern and Chinese. Contraband covers 70 percent of internal 
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trade and has become a major employer, much like agricultural harvesting on large 
farms was up until 1980. Smuggling networks, however, tend to decline with trade 
liberalization and diversify into other criminal activities, such as the trafficking of drugs, 
people, weapons or other goods of market value. 
Money laundering is the most sophisticated and difficult network to pursue since it 
consists of injecting the profits of illegal activities into the legal economy. Those who 
engage in drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, and, to a lesser extent, human 
trafficking, must all integrate themselves with strategic contacts and networks 
knowledgeable about state mechanisms. These contacts must have detailed knowledge 
of terrain and military discipline and organization. But they do not necessarily have to 
belong to the country’s elites. Money laundering, however, does require criminals to 
extend their network to the top of the social pyramid, for both banking and financial 
services, as well as for investing in large commercial centers, corporations, old-style real 
estate and exclusive residential condominiums. Where this does not occur -- and when it 
occurs, certain elites tend to control the process, all the way down to drug trafficking 
and trafficking of people -- drug cartels will still use large amounts of cash in their 
transactions, especially in the country’s interior or in border regions where state 
controls are weak. 
Other criminal networks are operational in Guatemala. They are minor but well-
organized criminal structures that engage in multiple illegal activities. This rarely 
happens independently, and in most cases they are linked to networks that engage in the 
drug trade or the trafficking of people, weapons or contraband. They typically look to 
associate with or become extensions of Guatemala’s official security apparatuses and the 
judicial system. The most prolific of these are the kidnapping networks, followed by 
networks for extortion and assassination. They often involve mid-level businessmen and 
other individuals who employ gang members as hired guns. Finally, the networks of 
muggers and thieves are much more decentralized, and typically involve police officers. 
Major Challenges for the State and Society 
A premise of the "Elites, State, and Organized Crime” project -- and of the general 
understanding of the status quo following the fall of the Berlin Wall -- is that for elites in 
the countries of Mesoamerica, organized crime represents a threat because it is an 
invasive foreign body. From an economic point of view, its visibility muddies the 
business climate, its enormous liquidity upsets market prices, and its foray into business 
activities generates unfair competition. From a policy perspective, corruption has 
unleashed criminal enterprises and led to a loss of confidence and legitimacy in rule-of-
law institutions, further destabilizing them. In countries like Guatemala -- conservative 
and decidedly elitist -- the natural dynamics of promotion or social mobility often 
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equate to "intrusion" when not subject to "suspicion.” In Guatemala, elites usually 
distrust not just what they do not know, but what they do not control.  
But drug trafficking, for example, has brought with it mixed results for the elites and 
Guatemalan society. Drug activity has created economic circuits that have inoculated the 
overall economy. In certain areas of the east (Zacapa, Chiquimula, Jutiapa), northeast 
(Izabal), north (Petén) and northwest (San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango 
and Quiché), drug traffickers have fueled economies of consumption, production and 
service. These have higher standards than the formal market, and in fact have replaced 
the state’s social and security presence. The emergence of a middle class in these regions 
tied to this economy generates consumer demand for imported goods, homes with 
certain security standards, and recreational facilities, including hotels and restaurants. 
Moreover, the payment of wages to construction workers and farm workers, for 
example, is two to three times above the market rate. Projects include the construction 
of infrastructure and educational facilities and health centers, which the state does not 
provide, tightening associations with the informal economy. In addition, criminal 
money is penetrating weaknesses in financial and business capital. That is, criminal 
capital is no longer limited to flashy new business magnates; those with well-established 
family names are not immune to the lure of quick money. 
In the last three decades, a growing demand for market liberalization and less state 
interference in market decisions -- along with the end of the civil war and temporary 
absence of hypothetical border conflicts -- have limited the traditional model of 
public/private relationships. But, as already noted, limited institutional reform and 
discretionary forms of privatization left the state vulnerable. Additionally, an emergency 
occurred, with transnational organized crime mobilizing massive quantities of money it 
had gained. This atmosphere of widespread corruption, weak institutions and law-
breaking security structures proved an ideal breeding ground for criminal activity. 
Thus, the main threat facing Guatemala is the growth of corruption via violent criminal 
practices. The attraction of the old corruption networks to criminal groups with 
international links tends to occur because of the mutual need to win the complicity 
and/or protection of political authorities or security structures -- and even alliances with 
certain economic elites -- to carry out illegal activities without interference. As we can 
see in our Guatemala case studies, the line between corrupt and corrupting networks, 
along with criminal networks, becomes blurred. 
*Edgar Gutiérrez is a Guatemalan economist and political analyst. He was secretary 
of the Strategic Analysis Secretary and foreign chancellor during the Alfonso Portillo 
administration (2000 - 2004). He also coordinated the “Recuperation of the Historical 
Memory” (Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica - REMHI) project. He is currently 
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director of the Fundación DESC for Latin America and Institute of National Problems 
at the San Carlos University in Guatemala. Map by Jorge Mejía Galindo. Graphics by 
Andrew J Higgens. 
Endnotes 
 [1] Marta Casaus, Guatemala: linaje y racismo (San José 1992). 
[2] For example, the institutional break (with the coup attempt by President Jorge Serrano in May 1993), 
the negotiation with the political regime (Peace Accords of 1996) or social upheaval (constant land 
takeovers by peasant farmers, local rejection of mining projects, among others). 
[3] An example of the tariff policy that benefits the oligarchies is the Government Accord 701-94, from 
November 1994. With the stated goal of “slowing the effects of disorganization in the market as a result of 
the importation of dead poultry from third-party nations,” the accord established a 45 percent tariff for 9 
high-demand poultry products and 5 percent for two other (processed) products. However, it excludes 
“from the previous assessment the importation of 300 metric tons per month,” subjecting those to the 
Central American standard of 20 percent. Of course, only one company was importing that specific 
amount and was therefore the exclusive beneficiary of the legislation. 
[4] The country was also enjoying international recognition for signing a peace accord in December 1996, 
which led to more cooperation and assistance, and also proposals for reforms in security and justice. 
[5] Since the country returned to democracy, there have been 80 political parties formed. All of them have 
fragmented and 75 percent of them have disappeared. In the last three elections (2007, 2011, 2015), more 
than 20 political parties, on average, participated in these elections, the majority of which were new 
parties. A good example of this is the FCN-Nación, the winner of the national election in 2015, in spite of 
the fact that it has no national presence. 
[6] Rachel M. McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent Revolution (Gainsville, 
1999). 
[7] Data obtained from the Guatemala Attorney General’s Office in 2015. 
[8] The DEA estimates that 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States, not counting 
seizures, comes from Guatemala. On average, a kilogram of cocaine enters Honduras or via the Pacific 
seaboard at $11,000, and, after traveling 200 or 300 kilometers, is sold at $13,000. This estimate 
provides an idea of the economic magnitude of this trade.   
[9] United States Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2007,” February 
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The CICIG 
By Steven Dudley* 
 
n the morning of February 19, 2007, three Salvadoran members of the Central 
American Parliament and their driver crossed into Guatemala to attend a 
meeting with other regional delegates. Shortly after entering the country, they 
disappeared. Their burned bodies were found later on a dirt road about 50 kilometers 
from Guatemala City alongside the still-smoldering remains of their car. Before it was 
torched, the vehicle had been taken apart, as the perpetrators presumably searched for 
either drugs or money -- or both. 
Guatemala’s Interior Minister Carlos Vielman dispatched his top operatives to deal with 
what became known as the “Parlacen case,” after the Spanish acronym for the Central 
American Parliament. By February 22, Guatemalan authorities had captured four 
policemen and had formally accused them of killing the three parliamentarians and 
their driver. However, almost immediately after the arrests, it was apparent that 
something was amiss. 
One of the policemen captured was Luis Herrera López. Herrera was part of a select 
group of police who was working under Victor Rivera Azuaje, a shadowy Venezuelan 
who had worked for years with Central American governments and the private sector, 
dealing with kidnappings and other security matters. 
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Rivera Azuaje was Interior Minister Vielman’s right-hand man at the time, and after the 
arrest of the four policemen, he showed up to talk to them. In a video taken of the 
meeting at the Interior Ministry in downtown Guatemala City, the tension between the 
captured police and Rivera Azuaje is evident.1 
“I am telling you, I am taking you all down with me, because I, I am taking you all 
down!” Herrera tells Rivera Azuaje. “I’m going down for this. We asked for help, and 
this is what you give me? This is the help that you are giving me?” 
Rivera Azuaje responds to Herrera, but the microphone does not capture the audio. 
“I am telling you: you are going to remember me,” the policeman says, his face in an 
angry knot. “You and everyone else. You are going to remember me! I promise you. I 
swear on my mother’s grave.”  
Three days later, the four police suspects were found dead, killed execution-style in a 
prison some 65 kilometers south of Guatemala City. The authorities quickly blamed it 
on gang members, but it was clear that a cover-up was underway. Later investigations 
linked the massacre of the police suspects to the “Three ‘V’s”: Victor Rivera Azuaje; 
Victor Soto Diéguez, the former head of the police investigations who was also part of 
Vielman’s inner circle of operatives; and Victor Rosales, the head of the prison system.2 
At the time, the government, civil society groups and parts of the international 
community were pushing for the establishment of a new, international body to help it 
deal with cases like these. They called it the International Commission Against Impunity 
in Guatemala (Comisión Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala – CICIG). The CICIG was 
an experiment in justice. Designed as a special aide to the Attorney General’s Office, the 
commission could act as both watchdog and assistant prosecutor, all with the 
imprimatur of its sponsor, the United Nations. It was staffed with international 
investigators, who were meant to be less susceptible to pressure and corruption. 
Understandably, Guatemalan lawmakers and other authorities were dubious, but the 
Parlacen case helped turn the tide of the debate in the CICIG’s favor and, in part due to 
this spectacular series of crimes -- and Vielman’s lobbying -- Congress eventually 
approved the CICIG. 
Vielman and many of his colleagues who pushed for the CICIG never thought it possible 
that the commission might one day go after them. But Vielman’s possible participation 
and cover-up of the Parlacen case and several other crimes would become a central part 
of CICIG’s work. By 2009, commission prosecutors were pushing for then-CICIG 
Commissioner Carlos Castresana to bring these cases to trial. 
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They alleged that, as interior minister, Vielman had various special units, such as that of 
the Venezuelan Rivera Azuaje (pictured), and another run by police investigator Soto 
Diéguez as well as two other top police officials. Rivera Azuaje’s unit -- which took on 
the name “Riveritas,” an homage to Rivera Azuaje’s 
leadership -- and the other unit, CICIG investigators 
claimed, were more than special forces.  
They were a “social cleansing” outfit who started out 
extrajudicially executing suspected criminals, including gang 
members, kidnappers and bank robbers who they captured 
or who had escaped from prison. They soon moved into 
more sophisticated criminal acts such as theft of drug 
shipments, kidnapping and extortion. All of these activities, 
CICIG prosecutors said, were directed by or approved by 
Interior Minister Vielman. 
Vielman was no ordinary suspect. He was a member of the 
country’s traditional economic elite. He was once the 
president of the Industrial Chamber of Commerce of 
Guatemala’s foremost business association, the 
Coordinating Commission of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial 
Associations (Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales 
y Financieras – CACIF). The CACIF is a multipronged institution with vast political 
influence, and Vielman was close with some of the most conservative and powerful 
members of the business elite. 
When his prosecutors came to him with the cases against Vielman and the Riveritas two 
years after the Parlacen murders, CICIG Commissioner Castresana faced a dilemma. 
Vielman’s support had been vital to the creation of the CICIG. What’s more, Castresana 
had developed a relationship with numerous members of the economic elite who were 
closely linked to Vielman. These relationships were an important part of the 
commissioner’s work: the CICIG needed allies in order to operate in an immensely 
challenging place like Guatemala. 
Yet some of the commission’s prosecutors and outside critics said Castresana had 
become too close to these elite allies, that they influenced his decision-making, and 
delayed or even undermined justice. Castresana is a tough man with a strong personality 
who was hardly one to cower in the face of traditional authority. But in Guatemala, 
when Castresana’s prosecutors came to him with information connecting Vielman to 
Parlacen and other cases, the CICIG commissioner balked, saying that the evidence was 
not strong enough or that it was not the right political moment. 
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The question of how much influence these elites exerted over Castresana -- and by 
extension the CICIG -- is at the heart of this case study. Castresana was not corrupt or 
nefarious. The Spanish judge did the hard work of setting up the commission, pushing 
for important legal reforms, helping to vet the country’s putrid court system, and to 
train local prosecutors in modern criminal investigative techniques. He prosecuted 
several important cases, including a landmark case that saved the presidency of Álvaro 
Colom, which was on the brink of collapse due, in part, to pressure from various rival 
elites. And the CICIG -- after Castresana left -- did eventually bring cases against some 
of those accused in the Vielman cases, although many of them, including Vielman, were 
tried in Europe. But questions remain about his tenure, questions that we probed for 
this case study. 
To do this study, we investigated the actions of the controversial and often celebrated 
Commissioner Castresana through dozens of interviews with former CICIG employees, 
government officials, diplomats, and political and judicial analysts. We also analyzed the 
CICIG in the larger context, and we studied the CICIG’s cases and tried to determine 
whether the commission targeted or favored one group over another. Most of all, we 
looked closely at specific, hallmark cases through the prism of the battle between the 
different elites in Guatemala. Among them was the case the CICIG built against 
Vielman, but there were many others, some of which involved the reason the 
commission was created in the first place: the CIACS.  
The CIACS 
The CICIG is a byproduct of Guatemala’s brutal civil war, and the development of what 
became known as Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos 
Clandestinos de Seguridad - CIACS). That war had its origins in the 1954 US-backed 
military coup which overthrew President Jacobo Árbenz. The coup was the beginning of 
a vast upheaval, and in 1960, with the country still under military rule, a group of mid-
level army officers declared the government corrupt and began an insurrection that 
started a 36-year long civil war.  
The rebellious military officers soon gave way to students, labor leaders and indigenous-
backed insurgent groups who fought mostly from the northwest highlands. Eventually 
they formed an umbrella organization -- the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity 
(Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca - URNG). The URNG was a poor and 
disorganized guerrilla organization, which would never resemble its organized, 
disciplined insurgent brethren in Nicaragua or El Salvador, both of which eventually 
forced major changes in their own countries. 
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The URNG’s weakness was due, in part, to the Guatemalan military’s strength and its 
ability to marshal support from the country’s economic elites and foreign allies like the 
US government. In response to the insurgency, the military expanded its hold on power. 
While it did not always control the executive branch, it effectively determined who 
would become president for nearly four decades after overthrowing Árbenz. It also 
strengthened its intelligence services and took control of numerous important 
government institutions, from the customs agency to the finance ministry. And it 
exerted a vast amount of control over the war effort. Soon it was gathering information 
from the country’s rebel groups and economic powers alike. Eventually the war was as 
much about illicit interests as it was about capturing and killing rebels. With it, the 
military began a more 
clandestine, nefarious chapter, 
which included collecting 
“quotas” or bribes from 
legitimate and illegitimate 
businesses for movement of 
their goods across Guatemala’s 
borders, and obtaining control 
over various contraband routes. 
This shift culminated in March 
1982. As the guerrillas 
continued a mini-surge in the 
highlands that had begun in the 
late 1970s, a military-civilian 
junta overthrew the government 
of Gen. Romeo Lucas García. At 
the top of this junta was Gen. 
Efraín Ríos Montt, a decorated 
officer and one-time 
presidential candidate who had 
converted from Catholicism to 
an evangelical church that 
espoused an apocalyptic vision 
of the world. With the guerrillas advancing, Ríos Montt applied a quasi-religious 
counterinsurgency approach that in some ways fulfilled the gospel of his own church. In 
the northwest highlands, the guerrillas’ stronghold, the army began a “scorched earth” 
campaign, killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands. News of the 
massacres seeped out, and Guatemala became an international pariah -- though not for 
the US government. The military’s war crimes would be subject to scrutiny for years to 
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come. And in its report following the war, the UN truth commission (Comisión para el 
Esclarecimiento Histórico - CEH) would say the army had committed “acts of genocide 
against groups of Mayan people,”3 setting the stage for future prosecutions, one of which 
would be against Ríos Montt himself. 
However, in the early 1980s, few could challenge the general’s regime. Ríos Montt froze 
the constitution, implemented secret courts, and tracked down political dissidents and 
suspected guerrillas in the cities. Through the Presidential Intelligence Service (Estado 
Mayor Presidencial - EMP), as well as other branches of military intelligence, the 
government kept watch on political dissidents, human rights groups, union leaders and 
student activists. The EMP kept files, or “archivos,” on these dissidents, earning it the 
moniker: “El Archivo.” Working closely with the military’s famed intelligence services, 
the G-2 and D-2, the EMP rounded up dozens of dissidents, then killed or disappeared 
them. One Guatemalan military document, released by the National Security Archives, 
listed 183 disappeared between 1983 and 1985.4 
With their rising influence in political affairs, 
Ríos Montt (pictured) and the military he 
represented became a threat to the traditional 
economic elites. The army established a bank. Its 
officers obtained large tracts of land and bought 
cement companies, parking garages, and fish 
farms, among other businesses.5 Military 
personnel also created their own political parties 
or joined with others. In sum, they became 
bureaucratic elites,6 who directly challenged the traditional elites in the beverage 
industry and the agro-industrial sector as early as the 1970s. 
At first, the bureaucratic and traditional elites did not openly squabble, in part because 
they had a common enemy: the URNG. One member of the powerful CACIF business 
association was part of Ríos Montt’s ruling junta, and others helped the army implement 
its counterinsurgency strategy. Among various means of support, the businessmen 
provided airplanes to drop bombs.7 The CACIF also lobbied to keep Guatemala from 
being frozen out of international aid due to human rights violations.8 It would be a 
short-lived alliance of convenience that would end when Ríos Montt and his political 
party would turn their sights on the traditional elites and their businesses two decades 
later. 
Ríos Montt was ushered from office just short of 17 months after the 1982 coup, and 
Guatemala returned to a democratically elected government in 1985, but the military 
retained considerable power and continued its dirty war against opposition groups. The 
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presidential intelligence service, EMP, was at the core of what was, in essence, a parallel 
government that worked to maintain impunity for the military’s past and present 
crimes. Human rights defenders were regularly targeted, as were union leaders, student 
activists, journalists and public prosecutors. This parallel government -- or what was 
often referred to as “hidden powers” -- also set the stage for the development of large 
scale organized crime in Guatemala. Military personnel, both active and retired, used 
their government posts to facilitate criminal activities, such as moving contraband or 
illegal drugs. They provided illegal weapons, intelligence or security services to criminal 
groups. And they assisted in illegal adoptions, human smuggling, and the issuing of false 
government documents. 
By the early 1990s, the parallel state had a name: Illegal Clandestine Security 
Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad - CIACS). The 
CIACS were not a single unit or organization, but loosely defined groups who had 
worked with each other during the war, mostly in the intelligence branches of the 
military. Some of these groups had names such as the “Cofradía,” or the “Brotherhood,” 
a reference to the Mayan elders’ means of organizing themselves; others were part of 
what was called the “Oficiales de la Montaña,” “Officials of the Mountain,” or simply, 
“La Montaña.”9 They were not criminal operators as much as criminal facilitators, the 
contractors for organized crime who put everything in place so crime could happen on a 
large and often systematic scale. Their networks were thought to be so powerful and 
cunning that they could topple a government without the slightest hint they were even 
involved. 
The face of the CIACS was Gen. Francisco Ortega 
Menaldo. The general is a near-perfect example of a 
member of the bureaucratic elite. In the early 1970s, he 
worked with the EMP. Later, he worked in the Finance 
Ministry. He married the daughter of an ex-president, 
himself a former military officer. In the mid-1980s, he 
became head of the G-2 military intelligence division. 
And in the early 1990s, during the presidency of Jorge 
Serrano Elías, Ortega Menaldo ran the EMP, where he 
became what the country’s leading magazine called 
“the government’s shadow.”10 The article -- which had 
a cover photo of Ortega Menaldo that said he was: “the 
most influential man in the government” -- said the 
general set up microphones so he could keep tabs on 
all the conversations in the presidency. He controlled 
nearly every aspect of the president’s agenda, the 
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article added, and could filter what the president read; he had the power to keep 
ministers at a distance and cancel media interviews. 
“When the president wakes up in the morning, he is there, neat, polished, in his perfect 
uniform,” the article began. “‘What do we have today,’ Serrano asks.”11 
Ortega Menaldo was also a criminal who ran the most powerful of the CIACS -- the 
Cofradía -- according to Guatemalan and US investigators who spoke to InSight Crime. 
In the early 1990s, Ortega Menaldo and his military cohorts skimmed millions of dollars 
from customs proceeds.12 The scam took on the name Moreno for its principal operator, 
Alfredo Moreno, a former military intelligence officer who had worked under Ortega 
Menaldo when he was head of the G-2 intelligence division. The Moreno case involved 
falsifying bills of lading and the theft of merchandise, among other schemes. It reached 
the highest levels of the security sector, including the chief of police and numerous 
military officials, who received regular envelopes with cash from the customs office. 
The money did not just line their pockets, but was used to undermine justice, 
particularly attempts to prosecute military personnel for past and current human rights 
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violations and extrajudicial murders. One such case was that of Myrna Mack, an 
outspoken anthropologist and human rights activist who was assassinated by members 
of the EMP in 1990. The case dragged through the courts for years, mainly due to the 
bribes, intimidation and backscratching that characterize the Guatemalan judicial 
system. The murder would have remained in impunity if not for Myrna’s sister, Helen, 
who created a foundation in her name to honor Myrna and seek justice. In the end, the 
killer was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Still, although the case 
established that the assassin was acting on orders from the top levels of the EMP, only 
one higher-up was convicted. 
Ortega Menaldo was an integral part of the plan to undermine justice in the Mack case, 
but he was never prosecuted. Nor did he face justice for the Moreno case. Years later, 
the United States suspended his visa for his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. 
Sources in the Interior Ministry told InSight Crime that for a high price he also provided 
false documents to criminal groups and facilitated illegal adoptions. But he never faced 
any charges for those alleged criminal acts either. Even worse, by the early 2000s, 
Ortega Menaldo was back working behind the scenes with another president. Ortega 
Menaldo was, in a word, untouchable, a symbol of the strength of the CIACS and the 
impunity that surrounded them. The CICIG was established to change that equation. 
The Rise of the Bureaucratic and Emerging Elites 
In 1994, the Guatemalan government and the guerrilla umbrella organization, URNG, 
signed the Global Human Rights Accord. The accord was the first part of what would 
become the final peace accord that was signed between the two sides in December 1996, 
and it provided a hint of what would become the CICIG’s future emphasis on the 
bureaucratic elites like those in the Cofradía but did little more. “To maintain absolute 
respect of human rights, there should not be any illegal entities, clandestine security 
apparatuses,” it read. “The government recognizes its obligation to fight any 
resemblance of these groups.”13 
The peace accord did open the door to the first two post-war UN interventions in 
Guatemala: the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de las Naciones Unidas 
en Guatemala - MINUGUA), which monitored and helped implement the post-war 
accords; and the CEH, the special commission that focused on issuing a report on 
human rights abuses and war crimes during the conflict. Both experiences made some 
Guatemalans -- particularly those in the military -- wary of further UN intervention and 
prolonged the battle to implement the CICIG. The CEH, in particular, stunned and 
angered the Guatemalan establishment when it wrote that 93 percent of war crimes had 
been committed by government forces; and that the army had committed “acts of 
genocide” against the Mayan communities in the northwest highlands. (The 
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commission’s findings opened the door to a wave of local and international prosecutions 
that has not dissipated.) 
The wounds of these findings were still fresh when local human rights groups began 
clamoring for a new, more permanent commission that would help the Guatemalan 
government dismantle the CIACS. The problem had, in some ways, mutated following 
the peace accords, since the military had been cut to one-third its original size. Former 
members of the military sought new business opportunities, particularly in private 
security, but also in the powerful illicit networks proliferating in the region. Some of 
these networks, for example, were connected to the spectacular and troubling 1998 
assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi, who had headed up a team that wrote a multi-
volume report on human rights abuses during the war entitled: “Guatemala: Never 
Again.” But others were seeking legitimacy. They started businesses and formed their 
own political parties. Ríos Montt, for instance, created a political party, the Guatemalan 
Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco - FRG). 
The FRG illustrated the evolution of the CIACS in post-war Guatemala. The party was 
stacked with former military officials and received dirty money from the Moreno 
network to finance its campaigns.14 It recruited able and ambitious politicians such as 
Alfonso Portillo (pictured), a Guatemalan congressman 
who was himself a part of an emerging political elite. In 
2000, after narrowly losing the previous election, Portillo 
won the presidency. The FRG also won the most seats in 
Congress, and Ríos Montt became president of Congress. 
Ortega Menaldo became Portillo’s consigliere, someone 
to hold his hand while he pillaged the government coffers 
under the careful guise of Cofradía operatives placed 
strategically throughout the government. One of their 
schemes, it would later emerge, was to steal from the military itself. 
For the traditional economic elites, the FRG was the embodiment of how much power 
their rivals in the bureaucratic and these emerging elites had taken from them. Political 
parties and the military had long been beholden to these interests, serving as virtual 
messengers and glorified majordomos. However, Portillo’s administration challenged 
the status quo in unprecedented ways. He opened the door for chicken, beer, sugar, and 
cement imports, infuriating some of the most powerful Guatemalan elites such as the 
Gutiérrez-Bosch family, whose Pollo Campero franchise remains a sort of unofficial 
symbol of traditional economic elite power in the country. In addition, the FRG raised 
taxes on items like alcohol which angered the beverage giants, and imported sugar from 
Cuba to undercut the powerful sugar families. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime       	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   31	  
The party also challenged the traditional economic elites’ control of the country’s 
judicial system by changing laws on the selection of high court judges and the attorney 
general, among others. Specifically, they passed a new law that opened the internal 
elections of the country’s bar association to those operating outside the capital city. One 
member of this bar association, Roberto López Villatoro, used the new law to build 
coalitions outside the purview of the traditional economic elite. These coalitions helped 
select high court judges and changed the balance of power in the judicial system. 
If the FRG was the face of Guatemala’s bureaucratic elite, López Villatoro was the face of 
its emerging elite core. This group emerged during the import substitution period of the 
1960s and 1970s. Initially, they made their money from non-traditional imports and 
exports. Later, they profited from privatization processes during the neoliberal reforms 
of the 1980s. Throughout, they used their government connections to garner favor and 
to secure public monies. And they eventually established important economic bases that 
crossed into new industries such as oil exploration and hydroelectric power. 
For his part, López Villatoro made his money by selling “replica” tennis shoes and used 
tires from Asia, he told InSight Crime. His critics simply called these products 
contraband and started calling him “the Tennis Shoe King.” These critics argue that he 
used his money and high-level influence in the government to facilitate his explosion in 
wealth and his burgeoning control of the judicial system. López Villatoro’s allies 
included his brother, Julio César, who became a congressman, his then-father-in-law, 
Congress President Efraín Ríos Montt, and his then-wife, congresswoman Zury Ríos. 
The “first family of Congress,” as they were often called in the press, illustrated an 
important fusion of interests between the emerging and the bureaucratic elites, another 
terrifying prospect for the traditional economic elites. 
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The upheaval in Guatemalan political and economic circles went beyond the Portillo 
administration and the FRG. In the late 1990s, Guatemala gave more power over public 
spending to the municipalities and states. The result was an explosion in small 
construction companies that sought to take advantage of their local connections and the 
economic opportunities that came with them: while there were 84 construction 
companies registered in 1998, by 2014, that number was over 2,000.15 
 
These companies became an integral part of the country’s political and criminal 
structures. Public works contracts are a means through which favors are traded, 
campaigns are financed and criminal money is laundered. This merry-go-round of back-
scratching opened the way for the creation of new, often local political structures that 
are not dependent on the traditional economic powers for funding and are thus no 
longer beholden to them politically, another terrifying prospect for the traditional 
economic elites. 
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This spread of opportunity -- or as one former interior minister called it, this 
“democratization of corruption” -- extended to other parts of the government as 
well.16 Government bodies, such as Guatemala’s Social Security Institute, opened the 
door for the interests of the emerging and bureaucratic elites, some of them corrupt. In 
2002, the board of the institute faced scrutiny due to a deal with a suspected drug 
trafficker to build housing for the elderly. The housing was never built, and the alleged 
trafficker escaped prosecution.17 
The international community intervened in this complex cauldron of competing 
interests with varying degrees of success. In some respects, the international community 
serves as a sort of supra-elite, exerting economic, political and social control over 
various parts of Guatemalan society in ways similar to local elites. In other respects, the 
international community is a tool of the elites. With regards to justice issues, the two 
main players in this international community are the United States and the UN. And in 
the early 2000s, both were playing very active roles. The United States had decertified 
Guatemala for its failure to cooperate on counterdrug matters. Meanwhile, MINUGUA, 
the UN verification mission, was still in the country, monitoring the implementation of 
the peace accords. 
There was also still talk of establishing a special “commission” to pursue human rights 
abusers connected to the government and parallel, clandestine networks involved in 
criminal activities and abuse. In 1999, the UN special rapporteur on the independence 
of judges had recommended the establishment of “an independent enforcement agency 
with powers to investigate complaints of corruption in public office.”18 And in 2002, a 
UN technical commission complained of the undue influence of the clandestine 
networks known as the CIACS.19 
Cognizant of the country’s image and the importance of mending fences with the UN 
and the United States, Portillo assigned Edgar Gutiérrez, his most-able political 
operator, to deal with the issue. An economist and longtime human rights investigator, 
Gutiérrez was an integral part of Bishop Gerardi’s team that exposed the government’s 
central role in human rights abuses, torture and extrajudicial executions during the 
country’s civil war. He is also one of the country’s foremost authorities on organized 
crime.20 Portillo tapped him to be the first head of a government civilian-run 
intelligence unit, and, despite protests and criticism from his long-time colleagues in the 
human rights community, Gutiérrez took the job. 
Divorced from his former colleagues but not from his human rights and activist roots, 
Gutiérrez took up the fight for the CICIG when he became foreign minister in the later 
stages of the Portillo administration. During a lunch with José Miguel Vivanco, the head 
of the Americas division of Human Rights Watch, and President Portillo, the three 
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discussed the possibility of setting up a “commission” to eradicate the influence of the 
CIACS.21 The irony that the Cofradía -- the country’s principal CIACS -- was the beating 
heart of the administration, and its head -- Ortega Menaldo -- was a Portillo advisor did 
not come up, according to Gutiérrez. Instead, the three outlined the basic details of what 
would later be called the Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and 
Clandestine Security Organizations (Comisión de Investigación de Cuerpos Ilegales y 
Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad - CICIACS). 
Gutiérrez said he obtained the final signatures for the commission from the presidency 
and the UN just days before the end of the Portillo administration, but the proposal 
immediately ran into problems. Critics said that the agreement gave the commission the 
power to investigate criminal wrongdoing independently of the Guatemalan authorities, 
something that is against the country’s constitution. Gutiérrez disputed this claim, 
saying the opposition to the proposal was political, not legal.22 However, after the 
Constitutional Court rejected the proposal, it was a moot point. The CICIACS proposal 
had stalled. 
CICIG: The “Reset Button”? 
The person who picked up the CICIACS mantle following the Constitutional Court’s 
decision was newly elected Vice President Eduardo Stein. Like Gutiérrez, Stein’s 
allegiances are tough to untangle. Although he hails from a wealthy, elite family, Stein is 
seen as politically independent and forward thinking. To this day, he is still tapped to 
head up difficult national arbitration processes, such as a truth commission following 
the 2009 coup in neighboring Honduras. Stein was, in some ways, the personification of 
the Oscar Berger presidency (2004-2008). Berger said his government was a “business” 
administration, which may have been an understatement. 
The imprint of business association CACIF on Berger’s government was unmistakable. 
Where the FRG party filled positions with ex-military officials, Berger filled them with 
businessmen. Among his most important appointments was naming Carlos Vielman as 
interior minister. Vielman is the son of a military colonel, from well-heeled, traditional 
elite stock. These traditional elites saw themselves as a modern, inclusive group that 
could reestablish order following the FRG debacle. What that meant in practice is still 
up for debate, and the question lies at the heart of this case study. Vielman, for instance, 
coordinated security matters closely with scions of wealthy families who sometimes 
employed foreign mercenaries to do their dirty work. Among those mercenaries was 
Victor Rivera Azuaje, a Venezuelan who would eventually play a key role in some of the 
Interior Ministry’s most infamous extrajudicial activities. 
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Stein and Vielman had known each other for years, and when Berger named Vielman to 
his cabinet, the vice president became a key ally in the establishment of what would 
eventually become the CICIG.23 Stein consulted with the Constitutional Court and the 
Attorney General’s Office (known as the Minsterio Público - MP, in Guatemala). Stein 
and Vielman also met with members of Congress and traveled together to Washington 
to drum up support for the commission from the US government. In addition, Stein 
brought in advisors from civil society, such as Helen Mack of the Fundación Myrna 
Mack, to help him reformulate the proposal so that it centered more on impunity and 
had a wider purview than just cases involving attacks on human rights defenders, 
journalists and prosecutors.24 
The proposal had its opponents. The FRG and many other parties were wary of the 
commission’s mandate, which gave its objective as the CIACS. They felt, rightly so, that 
they were main targets. Members of CACIF were also fearful of the commission. The 
foreign minister, Jorge Briz, was openly against it, according to Stein25; so was the then-
attorney general, who saw it as a potential threat to his power. Nonetheless, most 
likened it to MINUGUA, an experiment that proved relatively harmless in their eyes. 
Stein told InSight Crime that few in the elites really understood the implications of the 
commission.26 
If the traditional economic elites had reservations, they were placated by the presence of 
Vielman in the process. There is some dispute about whether they saw the CICIG as a 
possible tool to use against their bureaucratic and emerging elite rivals. Renzo Rosal, 
who worked as a presidential adviser with the Berger government, said the 
administration saw it as a chance to hit “the reset button … change the cassette.”27 They 
thought the CICIG, in other words, could help them return to a time when the 
traditional economic elites ran the country and used the military as their guardians. “It 
wasn’t an elephant,” he said referring to the CIACS and the previous governments, “This 
was a heard of elephants.”28 
Stein, however, disputed this assertion. He said the elites close to the government took a 
more hands-off approach. They may not have thought the proposal was good, but they 
did not think it would affect them in any significant way. And in the best-case scenario, 
they thought that they might benefit. In either case, the presence of Vielman in the 
process calmed their nerves. “My principal ally was Carlos Vielman,” Stein told InSight 
Crime.29 
Opponents of the measure got what they wanted when the commission’s mandate was 
limited to two years. The entity was watered down further when the UN decided that it 
would not be a formal part of the multilateral body. Still, it had teeth. The commission 
would help “promote prosecution” and provide “technical assistance” to cases in 
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Guatemala. It would help fashion laws and provide “thematic reports” on matters of 
judicial and legal interest. It would also have the power to “initiate judicial proceedings” 
with “absolute functional independence.”30 
For elites like Vielman and his cohorts in the CACIF business association, the most 
important aspect was that the CIACS remained the stated objective of the commission. 
While the definition was broad, the bureaucratic and emerging elites were clearly the 
CICIG’s stated targets. 
The fundamental objectives of this agreement are: To support, strengthen and assist 
institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and 
clandestine security organizations and any other criminal conduct related to these 
entities operating in the country, as well as identifying their structures, activities, modes 
of operation and sources of financing and promoting the dismantling of these 
organizations and the prosecution of individuals involved in their activities.31 
The UN and the government signed the agreement in December 2006, but over the next 
several months, the government had a hard time getting Congress to act. Not 
surprisingly, Ríos Montt’s party, the FRG, which still held the reins of Congress, led 
efforts against the proposal. The effort to establish CICIG gained some momentum in 
February 2007, following the Parlacen murders and subsequent killings of the chief 
suspects. President Berger called on Congress to put the proposal on a fast track and, in 
a televised address to the country, said Guatemala’s enemy is the “crime that feeds off 
drug trafficking.”32 Other supporters included Otto Pérez Molina, a former general 
turned congressman and founder of the Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota - PP), a 
political movement on the rise. 
But other members of Congress stonewalled Berger’s and subsequent proposals. 
Congressional leaders called for numerous extraordinary sessions to debate the matter, 
but they could not get a quorum.33 Furious at the unwillingness to put it on the agenda, 
at one point a pro-CICIG legislator threw a plastic water bottle at the president of 
Congress.34 Even after proponents managed to get it on the docket, things did not look 
good. Just weeks prior to the vote, the foreign relations commission, under the 
leadership of Ríos Montt’s daughter, Zury, recommended Congress reject the 
commission.35 
On August 1, 2007, the day of the vote, pressure continued. Police told the president of 
Congress that there was a bomb threat and that he should evacuate the building.36 The 
president decided to hold the vote anyway, so Ríos Montt’s FRG party and other 
opponents stormed out of the session. European, UN and US diplomats also openly 
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lobbied for the accord. The US even threatened to suspend some economic cooperation 
with Guatemala should Congress reject the agreement.37 (CICIG brinksmanship and US 
pressure would become an enduring pattern for the commission.) And with 110 votes in 
its favor, only just above the minimum it needed, the CICIG was finally born. 
Round 1: Targeting the ‘Tennis Shoe King’ 
CICIG began functioning in September 2007, and dug into its various tasks. Among 
them were modernizing the laws on cooperating witnesses and putting a wiretapping 
law in place; helping the government to purge useless and possibly corrupt functionaries 
as well as police. However, what the Guatemalan people expected from the commission 
-- perhaps unfairly -- was for the CICIG to prosecute high profile cases, and on that 
aspect, it took several years for the commission to find its way. 
The commission’s problems could be broken into two major categories. The first was 
actually selecting the cases that it would help the Attorney General’s Office to pursue; 
the second was getting convictions and making these convictions stick in Guatemala’s 
corrupt courts. 
With regards to the first problem, CICIG had little trouble finding leads. Information 
arrived in abundance, as well as informants. However, sorting through this information 
and checking out the informants was an enormous job, and selecting priority cases from 
them was even more difficult. According to its 2009 annual report, the commission used 
“a process of inductive reasoning to determine, if it could or not, reach the parallel 
structures.”38 But what this meant in practice was not clear. The cases the commission 
highlighted in the 2009 report, for example, involved everything from murder to 
embezzlement. They included cases against drug traffickers, police, and common 
criminals. Two cases were tied to the presidency, and two were closely linked to the 
CIACS. However, there was little to tie the cases 
together. 
The man tasked with sorting through this morass of 
information and determining the CICIG’s priorities 
was the body’s first commissioner, Spanish 
magistrate Carlos Castresana (pictured). With vast 
experience in politically sensitive international 
prosecutions, Castresana cut a formidable figure. 
Before becoming the CICIG’s first commissioner, he 
crafted the case to go after Chile’s one-time dictator, 
Augusto Pinochet, as well as former Argentine military personnel for alleged human 
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rights violations. In his own country, Castresana had targeted the popular soccer club, 
Atlético de Madrid, for corruption. 
For many, he was perfect for the job. In addition to his experience going after corruption 
and military figures, he understood the CICIG, in part because he had visited Guatemala 
and participated in the first efforts to create the CICIACS proposal. Hard working, 
confident -- often to a fault -- and tenacious, he imbued his staff with a sense of purpose 
and belief. “He had a tremendous capacity to work,” one of his former prosecutors told 
InSight Crime. “He had enormous clarity in what he was doing.”39 
But he also had his shortcomings. While he had worked on numerous high profile cases 
during his career, his stature often fell short of his ego. Perhaps the case that irked him 
the most was that of Pinochet. Three people who worked with Castresana said he spoke 
openly about not getting more credit for his role in the case. One former colleague said 
he also sought a higher post, such as the head of the prestigious International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in the Hague, and saw CICIG as a stepping stone. 
In Guatemala, Castresana struggled to find solid ground, and his ego often rubbed 
people the wrong way both inside and outside of CICIG. The commissioner had little 
patience for incompetence and even less for bureaucracy. He compartmentalized 
information and streamlined cases through his office. When strong, competent 
prosecutors challenged him, he sidelined them. He refused to have a deputy, someone 
who might assist him in managing his relations with diplomats, politicians and elites 
alike.40 
Castresana also had problems with the UN. Since the CICIG was not technically a UN 
agency, anyone who worked for the commission would lose UN benefits and pension, 
making it nearly impossible to recruit personnel from within the UN. Once in the 
country, Castresana had to fundraise, hire security and find an office. To be sure, 
Castresana used this independence to his advantage as well, shunning multiple UN 
attempts to evaluate the commission’s progress and adherence to its mandate, among 
other matters.   
It was in this regard that Castresana faced some of his most formidable difficulties. 
Although the CICIG’s mandate centered on CIACS -- and boogeymen like former Gen. 
Ortega Menaldo were easily identifiable -- prosecuting these hidden powers was very 
difficult in practice. The task was made even harder by Guatemala’s antiquated laws, 
poorly educated administrative personnel, and poorly trained police and prosecutors. 
Castresana also had a hard time establishing working relationships with other judicial 
and security forces, who were not necessarily willing partners. And he had to figure out 
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how Guatemala worked beneath the surface, where the Ortega Menaldos were doing 
their dirty work. 
For this last task, Castresana relied on an inner circle of confidants that he developed 
early in his time in Guatemala. Castresana interviewed over 300 people when he arrived 
in the country, but only a few of them would become regular sources. These included 
local human rights investigators and foreign diplomats, former and current government 
officials, and, of course, members of the elite. These elites ran the gamut. One of the 
most important of them was Helen Mack, the founder of the Myrna Mack Foundation. 
Although Mack is from a well-to-do landed family, she operates more as a member of 
the social and intellectual elite, helping to set the security and human rights agenda in 
the country due to her access to and influence on a wide variety of actors.41 
An equally powerful voice with the commission was former Vice President Eduardo 
Stein, who remains an important member of the political elite. Stein ran interference for 
the commission as it tried to make inroads with government and diplomats, including 
US Ambassador Stephen McFarland. 
The traditional economic elite’s key representative was a 
lawyer named Alfonso Carrillo (pictured). Carrillo does 
not consider himself a member of the elite, but his firm, 
Carrillo y Asociados, is one of Guatemala’s oldest and 
has long represented one of the leading families of the 
traditional elite.42 For his part, Carrillo has been an 
important political and business interlocutor for 
business association CACIF for decades.43 
Carrillo and Castresana developed a close relationship and eventually shared 
information as well as contacts. Carrillo, for instance, said that he introduced 
Castresana to traditional economic elites such as Dionisio Gutiérrez Mayorga of the 
chicken empire that includes the Pollo Campero fast food chain and food import 
business. In an interview with InSight Crime, Carrillo played down this 
networking,44 but one former Carrillo y Asociados employee reported having attended 
dinners with Castresana, the company’s boss and members of these elites.45 It was, 
according to this former employee, a way for the elites to influence Castresana’s agenda. 
“They were contextualizing him in accordance with their own interests,” the former 
employee said.46 
Critics of Castresana say his relationship with Carrillo and his law firm went further 
than it should have and illustrated the commissioner’s bias towards traditional 
economic elites. To be sure, Carrillo directly assisted with the commission’s work. 
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Despite the fact that Carrillo’s law firm specializes in mergers and acquisitions, some of 
its members were assigned to assist CICIG. For instance, the former Carrillo y Asociados 
employee said he and others from the firm investigated a government embezzlement 
case. (He said Castresana became furious when, after months of work, the investigators 
had not gathered the necessary proof to prosecute the case.) 
Carrillo also helped CICIG with its second major problem: that of prosecuting the cases 
it helped bring to the courts. In its annual report in 2009, CICIG said it had opened 39 
cases, but there were few convictions.47 This was in part because of corruption in the 
courts. Even if the commission could successfully prosecute a case and win a conviction, 
appellate courts would overturn it. In order to get results, the commission decided it had 
to change the judges. 
For that, the CICIG turned its attention to the little known -- and often ignored -- 
process of selecting Guatemala’s high court judges. First, what are known as postulation 
commissions select the final candidates for the supreme and appellate courts, and then 
Congress selects the magistrates from those lists. The postulation commissions were 
designed to minimize political intrusion in the process. They were made up of law school 
deans, high court judges and bar association members. However, politics, and the 
corruption that often accompanied it, inevitably took over.48 For example, law schools 
were founded just to gain votes in the commissions. The selection of the bar association 
representatives to the commissions became like political campaigns, complete with 
posters, T-shirts and flag-waving rallies. And judges named to the commissions got 
showered with consulting work and other perks. 
Like other cases the CICIG would eventually tackle, the battle for the courts was as 
much about class warfare as it was about the criminal penetration of the state. The 
traditional economic elites had long controlled the high courts. But beginning in the 
early 2000s, Ríos Montt’s FRG party and its judicial operator, Roberto López Villatoro, 
aka the “Tennis Shoe King,” had begun manipulating the courts in their favor. They did 
this by investing in campaigns to elect their candidates to the bar association 
committees as well as recruiting law school deans into their fold, so they could use the 
deans’ votes in the postulation commissions and get their judge candidates on the lists 
sent to Congress. By 2009, López Villatoro had become an independent broker working 
for emerging and bureaucratic elites, which included members of the Álvaro Colom 
administration (2008-2012) as well as members of the FRG. 
With the help of Carrillo and others, the CICIG targeted the upstart lawyer. They had 
several investigators scour through López Villatoro’s life, searching for suspicious or 
illicit transactions with judges, lawyers and prosecutors. They studied his tax records, 
his bills of lading and the government contracts that he had won, and looked at his 
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travel records and his extracurricular activities. They also investigated the postulation 
commissions and the judges that these commissions recommended to Congress to be 
selected as Supreme Court magistrates and appellate court judges. Carrillo was present 
throughout, in the CICIG’s offices. 
“I was never sure what his role was,” Anibal Gutiérrez, the long-time political officer at 
the CICIG, said of Carrillo. “What I do know is that every day, or nearly every day, he 
was in the commission meeting with Castresana.” Three former CICIG investigators 
confirmed the regular presence of Carrillo during this period. 
To be fair, Carrillo was waging his own battle to clean the high courts, which included 
filing injunctions. He was also not the only outsider working with the CICIG. Others, 
such as Helen Mack, worked closely with the CICIG as it filtered candidates for the 
postulation commissions, and their subsequent recommendations for high court 
positions. But Anibal Gutierrez said that Mack’s presence was distinct. 
“Obviously no one can deny the importance of Helen [Mack] in Guatemala, and the 
weight that her word has in Guatemala is also clear,” Gutiérrez explained. “In contrast to 
Carrillo, though, it seems to me that Helen’s role was much more open, much more 
public, more direct because that’s the way Helen is. So she did it in a way that was much 
more transparent, if you know what I mean.” 
Still, like Carrillo, Mack represented interests that went beyond her own or her 
organization’s. 
“When we think of Helen’s role or her influence, we think of it as influence of 
Guatemalan NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in general, above all because they 
moved in a bloc,” he said. 
Some suggested that Castresana himself was unsure of whether the commission should 
even be engaged in the fight over the courts. This may have been related to the fact that 
the information the commission found on López Villatoro and the judges was neither 
criminal nor against the postulation commissions’ policies. Much of it centered on 
incompetence and nepotism rather than criminal wrongdoing. But it was enough for 
Castresana, a master showman as well as judge, to organize a press conference to vilify 
six judges who had just been named to the Supreme Court, and to undercut López 
Villatoro and his upstart allies in the process. 
“There is an investigation that is attempting to establish criminal responsibility of at 
least one person,” Castresana said, a PowerPoint presentation glowing behind 
him.49 “The businessman, Sergio Roberto López Villatoro.” 
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Castresana then accused López Villatoro (pictured) of pulling the necessary strings to 
ensure that 26 of his picks -- out of a total of 54 -- sat on the postulation commissions 
that selected the final candidates for Guatemala’s highest courts. “"We don't think these 
are the isolated actions of this person,” Castresana added. “These actions are 
coordinated with the interests of parallel structures.” 
Castresana said these “parallel structures” were 
illegal adoption rings, drug trafficking networks, 
military officials connected to human rights abuses, 
and corrupt politicians. López Villatoro, the Spanish 
judge insinuated, was engineering the courts for 
these criminal interests. Castresana said López 
Villatoro bought the favor of at least 11 judges and 
lawyers by paying for them to do post-graduate studies in Spain prior to the 2009 
postulation commissions that selected the high court judges. Of these, three became 
members of the commissions, Castresana said; others became candidates for high-court 
posts. 
Castresana also made references to “Terna X,” a mysterious three-person coalition 
within the postulation commission for the Supreme Court. This coalition had 
engineered the voting to ensure the election of four of the six judges that the CICIG now 
accused of being “unsuitable,” according to the commissioner. Castresana added that 
these Supreme Court judges were “tainted” by conflicts of interest and had issued 
questionable decisions regarding criminal and corruption cases; they lacked the “honor” 
that the posts required. Castresana offered nothing more, but the headlines -- and 
pressure from international as well as local civil society groups and elites -- proved 
powerful: a few days later, Congress removed three judges from their posts, in some 
cases without any investigative follow-up. 
López Villatoro -- and some in President Álvaro Colom’s government -- were devastated. 
López Villatoro filed a formal complaint to the human rights ombudsman’s office 
(Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos - PDH), and attacked Castresana for working for 
the traditional elites. He went to the Attorney General’s Office and offered to testify in 
any and all cases against him. Regarding the courses in Spain, he told the ombudsman 
that he, and several others, had pooled money to pay for the judges and lawyers because 
they were having trouble moving money into euros, a story he repeated to InSight Crime 
a few years later.50 
When InSight Crime asked López Villatoro about his coalition’s alleged connection to 
criminal interests -- including illegal adoption rings, drug trafficking, those involved in 
human rights abuses during the war and corrupt politicians -- he said that he had 
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dealings with a lot of people, and that he could not control his coalition’s 
interactions.51 Indeed, only one of the three judges removed had been linked to criminal 
interests; the other two were removed more for their lack of credentials and experience. 
López Villatoro’s analysis of the situation was that the traditional elites used Castresana 
to vilify him, and won. In the end, he said, the three “unsuitable” judges that were 
removed were replaced with pro-traditional elite judges cut from the same cloth as 
Alfonso Carrillo. Some supporters and critics of the CICIG agreed, including Carrillo 
and Mack. 
“He was talked into it,” López Villatoro said of Castresana. “His job was to take us out of 
the picture.” 
Still, others defended the results. In a cable from the US Embassy, Ambassador 
McFarland lauded the CICIG, and Castresana in particular, for his work. Ten of the 
thirteen magistrates that ended up on the court, the cable said, had not raised any red 
flags for either the commission or the embassy. “Getting a relatively clean court is of 
paramount importance for the rule of law in part because Guatemala’s Supreme Court 
administers the entire court system, in addition to being the final judicial arbiter,” 
Ambassador McFarland wrote. “Their [sic] appears to be little backlash against CICIG or 
the Embassy for their roles.”52 
Carrillo also defended his role and the results of the commission’s work. 
“We didn’t want to purge it,” he said of the judicial system. “We wanted to improve it.”53 
Round 2: ‘The Provisional Truth’ 
On the morning of May 10, 2009, Rodrigo Rosenberg, a prominent, Harvard-educated 
lawyer, whose law firm represented traditional economic and emerging elites alike, got 
on his bicycle and took a slow Sunday ride in Guatemala’s capital.54 Rosenberg was 
distraught. His girlfriend, Marjorie Musa, who was the daughter of one of Rosenberg’s 
clients, Khalil Musa, a prominent businessman, had been killed along with Khalil a 
month earlier in a grizzly gangland-style hit. After doing some digging, Rosenberg was 
sure that high-level officials in the Álvaro Colom administration had ordered the 
assassination, but he could not prove it. 
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Rosenberg (pictured) contemplated going public with 
his accusations, and some of his friends, including Jorge 
Briz, the former foreign minister and a leading member 
of the powerful CACIF business association, tried to 
dissuade him. Rosenberg also complained to a friend 
and client that he was a victim of extortion. He even 
gave the client, Luis Mendizábal, the phone number of 
those who he said were threatening him. 
Sunday mornings are quiet in Guatemala City, and as 
Rosenberg pedaled through the empty streets, at least five vehicles subtly tracked his 
movements. After about five minutes, he stopped his bike, and sat on a grassy knoll by 
the side of the road. A couple of minutes later, a man walked up behind him and shot 
him in the head, neck and thorax, killing him. 
News of Rosenberg’s death reached the CICIG quickly, and commission investigators 
were on the scene within hours. The next day, while investigators continued to pore over 
the initial clues, Rosenberg’s family and friends gathered for his funeral, where Luis 
Mendizábal, the friend who had taken the phone number of the alleged extortionists, 
began handing out a DVD to those in attendance, including the press. On the DVD was 
an explosive declaration from a solemn, formally dressed Rosenberg himself. Looking 
straight into the camera, he said “If you are listening or seeing this message, it is 
because I was killed by President Álvaro Colom.” 
In the 18-minute recording, Rosenberg also went on to accuse Colom, first lady Sandra 
Torres, and the president’s chief of staff of murdering his girlfriend Marjorie and her 
father Khalil Musa, and of being part of a scheme to launder and embezzle money from 
various government entities such as Banco de Desarrollo Rural (Banrural), a cooperative 
bank for small farmers.55 
“At the end of the day, the story is the same we have lived through too much in 
Guatemala,” he said, his sad eyes staring into the camera. “It’s the same story that we 
have heard and repeated these last few years. And we Guatemalans, we don’t do 
anything because there is nothing to do.” 
Just days after the assassination, President Colom asked the CICIG to take the case.56 It 
was an act of desperation. The video had gone viral, and Colom knew protests would 
quickly follow. Within a week, thousands of marchers dressed in white -- a symbol, they 
said, of “purity” -- were calling the president a “murderer” and demanding his 
resignation.57 Members of the traditional economic elites were helping to organize the 
marches. Some even called on Colom’s vice president to join them, but he refused.58 
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Rosenberg, on the other hand, was called a “hero” and a “martyr.” His haunting video 
was played over and over on local and international TV. His accusations were instantly 
considered credible, especially given the source: a respected lawyer to the elites who had 
been educated abroad. Even investigators at the CICIG at first accepted his version at 
face value. 
The struggle between Colom and Rosenberg’s supporters was a form of class warfare. 
Colom was from a prominent family and had been part of the CACIF before becoming 
the head of a government agency, formed after the war, that sought to alleviate poverty 
in rural areas. But he was never close to the powerful core of the traditional, economic 
elites, and his relations were particularly tense with the group known as the “G8.” 
The G8 was kind of an elite within the traditional economic elite. It included Juan Luis 
Bosch and Dionisio Gutiérrez Mayorga of the Gutiérrez-Bosch chicken empire; Juan 
Miguel Torrebiarte of the Banco Industrial; Rodrigo Tejada of the Castillo family’s beer 
conglomerate; and Fraterno Vila of one of the top sugar-producing families. It exerted 
incredible influence on political and economic policy. The G8 had direct access to the 
president, and, according to Colom’s former finance minister,59 bullied him when he 
tried to modernize the antiquated and grossly unfair tax system that had favored the G8 
and their cohorts in the CACIF for decades.60 
But the G8’s issues with Colom went beyond tax policy. After he was elected, Colom 
selected his own people to run the finance ministry, the tax collection agency, and the 
banking regulator, three government posts traditionally controlled by the CACIF. For 
her part, first lady Sandra Torres, with the help of her sister, began maneuvering to 
influence the selection of Supreme Court and appellate court magistrates, using similar 
methods to the Tennis Shoe King. The Colom administration, under the leadership of 
Torres, also shifted resources to fight rural poverty. 
To be fair, the traditional economic elites had some valid grounds for griping about the 
administration. One of Colom’s top political operators was connected to organized 
crime.61 Torres’ sister allegedly had ties to long-time organized crime figures.62 And, as 
outlined by Rosenberg in his video, there were accusations of money laundering and 
embezzlement, especially as it related to Banrural. 
The CICIG accepted Colom’s request for it to take the case, in the full understanding 
that it was both an opportunity and a huge risk. As noted, the commission was having 
trouble prosecuting cases, and even those it did prosecute often did not impress. One 
person working with the government on police reform pointed out that the criminal 
networks exposed through the commission’s work in those early days were already 
known and well documented. This person was more worried about the “parts that we 
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don’t see or hear about,” those CIACS members entrenched in mid-level government 
positions that are harder to detect and extract.63 Another top-level security official 
echoed these sentiments.64 The CICIG’s job seemed to be as much about public relations 
as it was about crime fighting and structural reform. As its own representatives said at 
the time, their job was more about creating hope than bringing about real change.65 
The Rosenberg case offered the CICIG a chance to change this narrative, and Castresana 
knew it. He also understood that it threatened the legitimacy of the presidency. He 
assigned dozens of investigators to pore over hundreds of phone records, track car 
registration and license numbers, view surveillance video, triangulate phone calls and 
locate witnesses. The investigators assessed the crime scene, chased down leads in 
remote provinces, and soon began listening to the main suspects’ phone conversations. 
After a few months, a uniquely Guatemalan picture emerged revealing what looked like 
a conspiracy within a conspiracy. The CICIG kept these preliminary results restricted to 
a small circle of investigators until September 2009, when the authorities arrested ten 
suspects, who they said were members of a hit squad for hire that had perpetrated the 
crime. Several tense months passed, until the CICIG and the Attorney General’s Office 
announced in January 2010 that they would hold a press conference to reveal who killed 
Rodrigo Rosenberg. 
As Castresana took the stage on January 12, his ever-present PowerPoint presentation 
glowing behind him, the country stood still. The investigation into Rosenberg’s death, he 
began, was “una verdad interina,” or “a provisional truth,” but one involving dozens of 
investigators from 11 countries, who had spent day and night unraveling this incredible 
tale. It hinged on Rosenberg’s state of mind in the period after his girlfriend, Marjorie 
Musa, was killed along with her father, Castresana explained. Between that moment and 
the moment the assassin shot him dead, Rosenberg was distraught to the point of 
suicidal: he revised his will, started giving away valuable heirlooms, and readied a 
gravesite so he could lay in eternity next to his slain lover. Castresana also said 
Rosenberg made cryptic statements to friends in public and via email hinting that he 
could not continue his life without her. 
Rosenberg was not just sad, but extremely frustrated, Castresana continued. Against the 
recommendations of his close friend Jorge Briz, the president of CACIF, Rosenberg 
prepared to make a public accusation against President Colom. Castresana said that 
Rosenberg’s client, Luis Mendizábal, who had his own grievances with the government, 
helped put him in touch with a longtime journalist, Mario David García. García filmed 
Rosenberg’s statement at the radio station where he was a popular right-wing host. They 
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copied the recording onto DVDs and got them ready for distribution in case something 
terrible happened to the lawyer. 
 
In early May, Rosenberg had sent his driver to buy four cell phones, two of which he 
kept, and two of which he sent to the cousins of his first wife, the brothers Francisco and 
José Valdés Paiz. As owners of a large pharmaceutical company, the Valdés Paiz 
brothers are part of the traditional economic elite. They were also close friends with 
Rosenberg. Unwittingly, Castresana said, the Valdés Paiz brothers put into motion the 
last part of what he called Rosenberg’s plan. Rosenberg told the Valdés Paiz brothers 
that he was receiving extortion threats and that he needed their help to kill the person 
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behind the threats. The brothers asked their bodyguard to find someone to do the job, 
which he did. 
On the morning of May 10, just before he began peddling down the quiet streets of 
Guatemala City, Rosenberg called the leader of the hit squad and said that the 
extortionist was leaving his home. The leader of the hit squad -- which Castresana called 
“professional” and “businesslike” -- communicated with his team, who were already 
patrolling the area in multiple vehicles. The vehicles tracked the target, and a lone 
gunman made his way to the grassy knoll where he shot and killed Rosenberg. 
In other words, Castresana concluded, Rosenberg had engineered his own assassination 
-- a kind of Guatemalan-style political suicide -- in order to destroy President Colom. 
“Who planned this deed?” Castresana asked the hushed audience. “Well, we have to 
conclude that it was Rodrigo Rosenberg himself.” 
The impressive investigation -- and Castresana’s riveting performance -- saved the 
Colom government. 
“You have gone above and beyond,” Colom later told the Spanish magistrate, “because 
your mandate was not to save democracy.”66 
However, the complicated case also revealed just how difficult it was for the CICIG to 
avoid becoming another pawn in Guatemala’s dangerous game of thrones. There were 
numerous interests in play -- those of the traditional, emerging, and bureaucratic elites 
among them -- and mountains of money at stake. 
For starters, Khalil Musa, the father of Rosenberg’s girlfriend, Marjorie, was from a 
prominent family in the emerging elite. Rosenberg believed that Khalil’s assassination 
was related to an invitation he had received to join Banrural’s board of directors. The 
bank had become an extremely lucrative and powerful entity, perhaps even important 
enough to attract the attention of traditional moneyed elites, whose fortunes were diving 
with the US stock market at the time, and who were promulgating rumors about the 
bank’s alleged nefarious activities, according to several accounts.67 
In his video, Rosenberg ignored this issue. Instead, he argued that Musa’s “clean” 
approach came in conflict with the alleged corrupt Banrural schemes engineered by the 
emerging elites. But when the CICIG investigated the Musa case, they did not find any 
evidence of Banrural’s connection to the murder of the Musas, or enough evidence to 
bring a case against the bank for corruption or money laundering. They did find, 
however, that Musa’s connections to a dangerous contraband network may have been 
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behind the attack.68 In every scenario, Musa’s daughter, Marjorie, appeared to be 
collateral damage. 
Unpacking other layers of this case also revealed how CICIG may have missed an 
opportunity to upend a powerful CIACS. Luis Mendizábal, the man who handed out 
DVDs at Rosenberg’s funeral, was a key CICIG informant in the case, and many of those 
interviewed by InSight Crime said that Mendizábal was manipulating the commission. 
This would not be out of character. Mendizábal was a classic Machiavellian in the 
Guatemalan style -- part tailor, part coup-plotter and part crime fighter. Intelligence 
documents that InSight Crime obtained from Salvadoran officials connect Mendizábal 
to clandestine right-wing political networks across the region dating back to the 1980s. 
He was also connected to a mysterious CIACS group, which called itself the “Los 
Oficiales de la Montaña,” (Officials of the Mountain) or La Montaña, which had 
participated in two attempts to overthrow Guatemala’s civilian government in the late 
1980s. 
In the late 1990s, Mendizábal used the office behind his boutique clothing store to meet 
with political officials, and former and current military officers. Dubbed -- appropriately 
-- “La Oficinita,” he and several cohorts, some of them ex-military intelligence officials, 
did everything from resolving kidnapping cases to undermining judicial investigations 
against active and retired military personnel. Rosenberg was Mendizábal’s lawyer, and 
was helping him fight the decision by the Colom administration to give a lucrative 
government contract to a rival bidder. For his part, Mendizábal was acting as 
Rosenberg’s handler in his personal investigation of the murder of his lover and was 
feeding Rosenberg information about the supposed conspiracy fostered at Banrural.   
The CICIG, and Castresana in particular, were criticized for not pursuing these lines of 
investigation, which many believed led to the real source of the destabilization plot at 
the heart of the Rosenberg case: bureaucratic elites -- possibly remnants of the La 
Montaña -- who sought to unseat President Colom. During the press conference, 
Castresana said that Mendizábal was a key witness in the reconstruction of the events 
leading up to Rosenberg’s death, but insisted that the shadowy Mendizábal “is not a 
friend of the commission or the Attorney General’s Office.” 
When asked about the existence of a plot to overthrow Colom, Castresana was emphatic. 
“From what we know, the answer is a resounding no,” he said. “We believe the evidence 
shows that Rodrigo Rosenberg was acting alone. Let me reiterate: he was not part of a 
conspiracy.” 
For their part, the traditional economic elites were furious at the results of the 
Rosenberg investigation. Not only did Colom remain in power -- and was arguably 
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strengthened by the results -- the case left some members of the elite exposed as 
employers of assassins. 
“An objective study of the crime scene takes us from Rodrigo Rosenberg to the Valdés 
Paiz brothers,” Castresana declared. “An objective study of the circumstances 
surrounding the victim takes us from Rodrigo Rosenberg to the Valdés Paiz brothers. 
And when we asked the ten people who have been arrested, they all confirmed that the 
people who requested the job be carried out were the Valdés Paiz brothers, and no one 
else. No politician. No minister. No police chief. No police lieutenant. No one. Only 
these brothers.” 
But in the end, Castresana’s “verdad interina” remained just that: provisional. The 
Valdés Paiz brothers eventually turned themselves in to the authorities, but were 
released on bail, and the case remains mired in legal challenges from their lawyers. The 
other cases the Rosenberg investigation had set into motion also stalled, including the 
Banrural corruption case and the Musa double homicide. No one seemed satisfied, and 
Castresana’s list of detractors grew. And while the case saved the presidency, the wheels 
of the Guatemalan elite’s retribution against Castresana himself were beginning to turn. 
Round 3: Chasing the Ghost of Ortega Menaldo 
Just days after Castresana’s theatrical revelation about Rosenberg’s suicide-murder, the 
CICIG arrested former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo on corruption charges. It 
was one of a series of arrests Guatemalan authorities would make during 2009 and early 
2010 for a case the Attorney General’s Office had built against the ex-president and 
several of his top administrators for embezzling money from the Defense Ministry’s 
pension funds. Simultaneously, the US released an indictment against Portillo on money 
laundering charges, and requested his extradition. 
The case further complicated Castresana’s life. On the surface, it seemed to involve the 
CIACS, specifically the country’s most powerful CIACS group, Cofradía, and its head, 
retired Gen. Francisco Ortega Menaldo. It also involved a former president, something 
that represented a particularly powerful feather in Castresana’s cap.   
However, it was also what one UN official called “a garden-variety corruption 
case.”69 What’s more, the Portillo case was part of a longstanding vendetta between the 
various elites. The families who traditionally controlled the poultry, cement and beer 
industries -- the famous G8 -- were still seething about the Portillo administration’s 
moves to open those sectors to competition and to subject them to higher taxes. And 
numerous critics of Castresana told InSight Crime that the commissioner pushed the 
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Portillo case because of his close connections to members 
of the elite such as Dionisio Gutiérrez Mayorga and his 
cousin, Juan Luis Bosch. 
Of these two, it is Gutiérrez Mayorga (pictured) who is 
more frequently cited as trying to influence Castresana. 
Gutiérrez Mayorga is a symbol of the traditional elites and 
a public figure. In addition to his high profile relationship 
with the Pollo Campero chicken business, Gutiérrez 
Mayorga had a television program -- “Libre Encuentro” 
(Open Encounter) -- and many said that he aspired to be 
president. His high profile made him the face of the G8 and 
brought him into direct conflict with his enemies. In 2003, when Ríos Montt’s 
supporters flooded Guatemala City to protest a court decision to exclude the former 
general from the presidential elections, close to a thousand supporters of Ríos Montt’s 
FRG party forcibly occupied one of Gutiérrez Mayorga’s office buildings.70 Gutiérrez 
Mayorga told InSight Crime that he was personally audited 16 times during the Portillo 
presidency.71 “They even looked under my rug,” he said of the government auditors.72 
Castresana’s supposed relationship with Gutiérrez Mayorga is the subject of wild 
speculation and rumors. Some -- such as a former CICIG prosecutor named Giséle 
Rivera -- told InSight Crime that Castresana traveled in a Gutiérrez Mayorga-owned 
helicopter to a remote island to vacation.73 She claimed that Castresana also took special 
care to make sure the traditional elites were informed of the progress in the Portillo case 
and to seek their counsel; she told InSight Crime that the commissioner gave at least 
one private presentation about the case at Gutiérrez Mayorga’s residence for a group of 
members of the elite. 
However, in an interview with InSight Crime, Gutiérrez Mayorga said he had met 
Castresana only twice in private settings, and twice to interview him for his television 
program. Neither meeting involved helicopters or vacation islands, he said. Others, such 
as Alfonso Carrillo, who said he had introduced the two men, also played down any 
friendship they may have had, saying that Castresana’s interactions with Gutiérrez 
Mayorga were about securing long-term support for the CICIG. 
To be sure, numerous ex-commission members scoffed at the idea that Castresana could 
be manipulated, much less succumb to undo influence. Castresana, who declined to 
speak publicly about any of these matters, was astute enough to understand the political 
implications of any relationship he had with elites, politicians or members of civil 
society, according to these former colleagues. What’s more, Castresana was keenly 
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aware of the political implications of the Portillo case -- and others -- and sought to 
publicly distance himself from these elites for fear he would be accused of tampering. 
“This isn’t a pure corruption case. Nor is it political persecution,” Castresana told 
Gutiérrez Mayorga on his television program Libre Encuentro in July 2009. “It’s a case 
about criminal conduct committed by a clandestine structure that needs to be 
dismantled.” 
But Gutiérrez Mayorga was also an adept operator, who understands that anything he 
does can be interpreted as influence peddling, or worse. He prefers to work through 
intermediaries, often lawyers like Alfonso Carrillo, the CACIF’s unofficial interlocutor 
with Castresana. To be sure, one former Attorney General’s Office official said that it 
was Carrillo who pushed the Portillo case and possibly a Carrillo-related law firm in the 
US that helped US prosecutors build their case in that country. For his part, Carrillo 
denied he had any such influence on Castresana. 
“He was very prudent,” Carrillo told InSight Crime. “Carlos never aligned himself with 
anyone.” 
Yet the criticism persisted, in part because of how flawed the Portillo case itself was. In 
addition to the doubts expressed by the UN official about it being a “garden-variety 
corruption case,” three former CICIG investigators told InSight Crime the case was very 
“weak” in judicial terms, leaving it open to manipulation from the deeply corrupt 
judicial system that was wary of prosecuting a former president in the first place. In 
these former CICIG investigators’ estimation, the commission should never have 
assumed the case nor pushed for it. The results seemed to confirm these sentiments. 
In 2008, after a four-year battle that finally secured Portillo’s extradition from Mexico 
back to Guatemala, a judge released him on bail. In 2009, another judge ruled that the 
CICIG could not assist the Attorney General’s Office. Castresana appealed the decision 
and won, but the problems continued. The commission had trouble securing 
cooperating witnesses for the case and getting proof of the CIACS participation in the 
scheme, particularly that of Ortega Menaldo. 
By mid-2010, although the CICIG had arrested Portillo’s finance and defense ministers, 
Ortega Menaldo seemed to have escaped yet again. And in early 2011, the court found 
Portillo and his two former ministers not guilty.74 Portillo walked out of the court with a 
huge smile. Portillo was later extradited to the United States where he was tried on 
money laundering charges and served but two years in jail. He has since returned and 
remains a prominent political figure in Guatemala. 
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In the interim, a nefarious campaign had begun to force Castresana from his post. At the 
UN and in public forums, rumors swirled about an extramarital affair. The smear 
campaign smelled of military intelligence, but it may have also involved the traditional 
economic elites, who had by then completely turned on Castresana when they found out 
that one of their own -- Carlos Vielman -- was the target of a CICIG investigation.      
Round 4: The Case of Carlos Vielman 
On April 1, 2008, a Costa Rican prosecutor named Giséle Rivera arrived in Guatemala to 
work with the CICIG. Rivera had studied in France, and had prosecuted numerous 
corruption and organized crime cases in her native land under the watchful eye of Costa 
Rican Attorney General Francisco Dall’Anese, who recommended she take the job in 
Guatemala. Her work had gotten her in trouble: she had received death threats, she 
would later tell a newspaper; she was tired of having police escorts in Costa Rica and 
was feeling “very alone.”75 But Rivera was not one to slow down. Her gumption would be 
an asset as well as a liability at the CICIG. 
A week after Rivera took the job, gunmen intercepted Victor Rivera Azuaje -- the 
Venezuelan security consultant who, until a week earlier, worked at the Interior 
Ministry -- and his assistant, María del Rosario Melgar, after they had left a restaurant. 
The assassins pumped 12 bullets into his car, eight of which hit Rivera Azuaje, killing 
him on the spot. Melgar was hit in the shoulder with an errant shot but was otherwise 
unharmed. Castresana put Giséle Rivera on the case. It would be her first chance to peek 
into the dark underworld of elite-criminal networks in Guatemala. Rivera Azuaje, his 
work at the ministry, and his former boss, Carlos Vielman, would become her obsession 
and lead to trouble on both a personal and a professional level. 
Rivera’s doggedness immediately clashed with Guatemalan prosecutors’ obstructionism. 
At first, the local investigators denied Rivera access to the case file and refused her 
request to re-enact the crime. They edited out sections of security camera video of the 
murder, and showed up unexpectedly when she went to search Rivera Azuaje’s private 
office. When the CICIG finally got access to the key witness of the crime, Rivera Azuaje’s 
assistant, Melgar, Guatemalan investigators were there, cutting parts of the 
interrogation short and permitting the witness to evade tough questions after she gave 
seemingly contradictory answers. When CICIG sought Melgar for further questioning, 
they were surprised to find that the head of the homicide unit, Álvaro Matus, had 
arranged for her to leave the country.76 Even more surprising, Matus had permitted 
Melgar to clean out her murdered boss’ filing cabinets. 
The Rivera murder case was the beginning of three-year long odyssey for Giséle Rivera 
that brought her into the belly of the Guatemalan beast. The CICIG later picked up the 
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Parlacen case -- the murders of Salvadoran members of the Central American 
Parliament -- and the case of the subsequent murders of the suspects in the Boquerón 
prison. The CICIG also started investigating the 2005 murders of six men who had 
escaped a prison known as the Infiernito, and the 2006 murder of seven men inside a 
prison known as Pavón. 
At first, the CICIG investigators did not realize these cases were connected. This was due 
to the way that Castresana had compartmentalized the information and the cases the 
commission was managing. But with time, and more than a few lunches together, the 
investigators realized that all of these cases were linked to Victor Rivera Azuaje and his 
boss at the Interior Ministry, Carlos Vielman. 
Rivera Azuaje had a long history of working in shadowy, partially sanctioned operations 
like the one he was operating under the Interior Ministry’s umbrella at the time of his 
assassination. In the 1980s, at the behest of the Christian Democratic Party in 
Venezuela, he went to help work with Christian Democratic Party presidents who were 
then in power in Guatemala and El Salvador. There are some77 who suggest that, at the 
time, he worked alongside Cuban and US operatives who were supporting right-wing 
efforts to fight leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and beyond. Rivera Azuaje left Central 
America after a short time but returned to El Salvador in the 1990s and again worked in 
an unofficial capacity, this time helping the government to resolve kidnapping cases.78 
In the late 1990s, after Rivera Azuaje was implicated in the death of a kidnapping victim 
in El Salvador, he moved to Guatemala. There, he again worked with the government in 
an unofficial capacity and with the financial support of business association 
CACIF.79 Rivera also supported other elites, such as Adela de Torrebiarte,80 who had 
established “Madres Angustiadas,” an organization dedicated to fighting kidnapping in 
Guatemala. She was from a prominent and politically-connected business family that 
had suffered at the hands of kidnappers. Her brother-in-law is Juan Miguel Torrebiarte, 
the head of the Banco Industrial and a member of the G8, the elite-within-the-elite. She 
would later become minister of the interior.81  
When Carlos Vielman (pictured) was named interior minister under President Berger in 
2004, the ministry hired Rivera Azuaje as a special consultant. In the ministry, Rivera 
Azuaje formed his own team of investigators -- most 
of them policemen -- whose job it was to resolve 
kidnappings and bank robberies. This team got access 
to all the resources and intelligence it needed. It was 
schooled in the telecommunications system and given 
exclusive information about where things such as pay 
phones and cellular antennas were.82 The team 
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became known as the “Riveritas.” Rivera Azuaje and his Riveritas were highly effective, 
and Vielman praised him for his work after he came under some scrutiny for possible 
involvement in extrajudicial executions. 
“The advisor … has resolved more than 500 kidnapping cases, more than 90 robberies of 
banks and other financial operations, has testified as an investigator in 800 court cases 
… They are trying to destroy a [security] structure that has broken up kidnapping and 
bank robbery rings,” Vielman told journalists in 2007.83 
However, by November 2008, Giséle Rivera and other investigators believed that Victor 
Rivera Azuaje and his team did much more than resolve kidnappings and bank 
robberies. In the Infiernito case, CICIG investigators discovered that the Riveritas had 
summarily executed the escaped convicts. In the Pavón case, investigators found that 
the police and military had entered the prison, where police had again executed the 
prisoners. And in Boquerón, witnesses told the commission that Rivera and his team 
had entered the prison and again executed the suspects, perhaps to cover up the fact 
that they had stolen $5 million in cash from the Parlacen representatives who were 
killed in February 2007. 
The testimonies, analysis of telephone calls, videos, photographs, official documents and 
other evidence painted a picture of something that began as an experiment in social 
cleansing with the Infiernito case; evolved into an attempt to take advantage of criminal 
operations with the Pavón case; and culminated in a full-fledged criminal organization 
with the Parlacen and Boquerón cases. That organization, Giséle Rivera and others in 
the CICIG said, included police chief Erwin Sperisen, deputy director of investigations 
Javier Figueroa, director of investigations Victor Soto Diéguez, and, of course, Victor 
Rivera Azuaje. Some of the witnesses and police who had worked with Victor Rivera 
Azuaje said these operations were carried out with the knowledge of then-Minister 
Carlos Vielman. As Giséle Rivera wrote in a January 13, 2009, memo addressed to 
Castresana: 
The investigative group believes that the CICIG should move to establish that 
Carlos Vielman, Javier Figueroa, Erwin Sperisen, Victor Rivera and Victor Soto 
Diéguez, acted as an organized crime group; that, using the powers they had, they 
could camouflage their criminal activities, which included social cleansing; 
assassinations; drug trafficking; money laundering; kidnapping; extortion; theft 
of illegal drugs; among others -- all with the goal of economic benefit for 
themselves. These activities all took place during the Oscar Berger 
administration, between 2004 and 2008.84 
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The implications for CICIG were tremendous. Vielman, a member of the traditional elite 
who had been director of the Chamber of Industry, an affiliate of CACIF, and who had 
lobbied for the creation of the commission, was suddenly a prime suspect in a series of 
explosive cases that involved extrajudicial executions, kidnapping, drug trafficking, 
money laundering and more. 
 
Over the next several months, the Costa Rican prosecutor wrote seven more memos to 
Castresana mentioning one or more of these cases. In a July 2009 memo, she 
recommended that the CICIG present the Parlacen and Pavón cases to the courts.85 In 
an August 2009 memo, she reiterated this recommendation.86 In other memos, she 
simply stated the hypotheses of the cases and recommended next steps for the 
commission to take. In numerous memos, she complained that the CICIG was not 
providing enough protection to the witnesses -- which included police deputy director of 
investigations Javier Figueroa and others who had participated directly as part of, or 
with, the Riveritas -- and exhorted the commission to make use of their evidence, 
especially as they appeared to be getting assassinated.87 In all these memos, the 
underlying message was the same: the CICIG needs to take action. 
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“To comply with the mandate of the CICIG, which requires it to identify criminal groups 
that are enmeshed in the state, we are obliged to look at the modality of this group, how 
it was structured -- from the moment it appears like a structure and how these 
individuals can be connected to a criminal group,” Rivera wrote in her January 2009 
memo. 
However, Castresana refused, and by November that year Rivera was exasperated, and 
starting to complain publicly that Castresana and the other CICIG higher-ups were not 
listening to her. Rivera said that they were also breaking agreements with potential 
witnesses and collaborators in the case, including Figueroa, and putting them in danger. 
Simply put, she believed Castresana was obstructing justice. 
“Having identified the members of this structure … would generate a huge problem for 
Castresana because he did not want these cases presented to the courts,” she would say 
in a written statement in 2012. “He started to obstruct the investigation; to say that we 
didn’t have proof and to say that we would not do any deals with those who had 
provided vital testimony because they were part of the structure. He even wanted to use 
their testimonies against them, in spite of the fact they were ready to comply with the 
deals. But Castresana was not.”88 
The Pavón prison raid was the case that most clearly implicated Vielman directly. The 
minister was at the prison when authorities retook it and seven prisoners were killed. 
The evidence indicated that the authorities had extrajudicially executed the inmates. But 
the CICIG, under Castresana, did not present the Pavón case. They also stayed away 
from the Parlacen and Infiernito cases during Castresana’s period.   
Why Castresana refrained from making a formal accusation against the Vielman 
network in all these cases is not clear. He has never spoken about it publicly, leaving his 
motives open to interpretation. Most Castresana critics, like Giséle Rivera, clung to the 
rumors about Castresana’s relationship with Gutiérrez Mayorga, and, to a lesser extent, 
Castresana’s relationship with Gutiérrez Mayorga’s cousin, Juan Luis Bosch. The exact 
nature of these relationships is hard to characterize, much less corroborate. 
Giséle Rivera says it was a “pact,” something to allow for Vielman to obtain Spanish 
citizenship and flee the country before his prosecution in the Pavón case. There is no 
evidence to support this claim, and the case was presented shortly after Castresana left 
the CICIG, leaving the impression that he left it prepared and ready to go. By then, 
Vielman was in Spain, Castresana critics point out. 
Giséle Rivera added that Gutiérrez Mayorga’s connection to the case was more than 
mere loyalty to class interests and his elite friend, Vielman. It was operational. 
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Specifically, she said that Gutiérrez Mayorga employed Rivera Azuaje. Rivera Azuaje did 
work with CACIF members for years, and he had an office in one of the Gutiérrez 
Mayorga office buildings. However, no investigation or government document that 
InSight Crime found establishes any connection between Rivera Azuaje’s alleged 
criminal activities and Gutiérrez Mayorga or his businesses. In the interview with 
InSight Crime, Gutiérrez Mayorga said he barely knew Rivera, and even said he did not 
recall his nationality. 
Castresana’s critics also ignore the numerous other logical reasons to refrain from 
launching these cases during 2009, the period in which Giséle Rivera was furiously 
writing her memos. For one, CICIG was tied up with the Rosenberg and the Portillo 
cases. The investigations depleted the commission’s resources and required it to expend 
huge amounts of political capital obtaining evidence and cooperation from authorities. 
There were political considerations as well. The CICIG, already battling various elite 
groups including the bureaucratic and emerging elites from the FRG party, could ill 
afford to open up another front. 
Finally, Castresana’s defenders say the case simply may not have been ready. As 
opposed to the Rosenberg case, which relied on telephone records and other forensic 
evidence, the Vielman-related cases relied heavily on witness accounts. Securing 
witnesses was difficult, especially since the government was still struggling to set up its 
witness protection program and key sources like Rivera Azuaje were getting killed. 
Relying on witness testimony was not a sound strategy when going after an ex-minister 
from the country’s elite. 
But here again, there is a dispute, especially as it relates to the Pavón case. The key piece 
of forensic evidence investigators obtained to make the Pavón case was a video, from 
which they could extract photographs of the seven victims who had supposedly taken 
part in a riot and shot at police before getting killed themselves in what the police said 
was a gun fight. However, the pictures showed at least one of the prisoners who was 
later assassinated exiting the prison into a courtyard -- not battling with police at the 
end of a gun, as the police had testified. This prisoner, who was a leader of the group 
that had taken control of the jail, was later found shot dead in another part of the prison 
with a gun next to him. 
Castresana defenders say CICIG got the video in early 2010, after Giséle Rivera had left 
the CICIG. Giséle Rivera says she obtained the video in March 2009, during a visit to 
Colombia. There she met with family members of one of the victims who passed her the 
video. Internal records obtained by InSight Crime do show that Rivera requested to 
travel to Colombia in early 2009, as part of this investigation. 
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The she-said-he-said nature of this case became even more complicated after Giséle 
Rivera had legal problems of her own, giving rise to strong doubts about her recounting 
of the facts in the case, her interpretation of Castresana’s motives and her own motives 
for speaking out publicly. In December 2009, unbeknownst to the CICIG, she and 
another commission investigator met with Stefano Figueroa -- the brother of former 
police deputy director of investigations Javier Figueroa -- to discuss his defense strategy. 
Following the Parlacen and Boquerón murders, Figueroa fled to Austria, where Rivera 
and another investigator interviewed him. In Austria, Figueroa painted himself as an 
innocent bystander to a series of murders and other crimes committed by his police 
colleagues. 
Back in Guatemala City, Giséle Rivera and the CICIG investigator who accompanied her 
talked with the Figueroa family about how to protect Javier. She had allegedly withheld 
the Austria interview from CICIG on the grounds that the commission had not honored 
its agreement with him to be a collaborating witness; she also allegedly ignored evidence 
that pointed to him as one of the culprits of the Pavón killings. Days later, Rivera 
resigned from the CICIG, but she kept in touch with Javier Figueroa. In June 2010, the 
two talked on the phone. (The Figueroas taped the December 2009 meeting and the 
June 2010 phone conversation). During the phone conversation, Rivera reiterated that 
she had withheld his testimony from the commission, which she said had made 
Castresana angry. 
“[Castresana] used to go and talk to tons of people,” she told Figueroa. “He said that…I 
wanted to forgive you and not do anything.” 
The Attorney General’s Office seized the recordings when its staff arrested Stefano for 
his participation in the alleged activities of his brother, Javier. Prosecutors used them as 
evidence in a case they eventually brought against Rivera and the CICIG investigator 
who accompanied her to the meeting with the Figueroa family for obstruction of justice. 
In November 2011, Rivera’s old boss, Francisco Dall’Anese, who eventually took over for 
Castresana as the head of the CICIG, withdrew her immunity. She told InSight Crime in 
2013 that they had not spoken since. Her movements restricted due to the obstruction of 
justice case, Rivera was back in Costa Rica. 
Round 5: ‘You Have to Know When to Leave’ 
By the beginning of 2010, Castresana had a long list of enemies that read like a “Who’s 
Who” of Guatemalan power brokers: bureaucratic elites from the CIACS such as former 
Gen. Francisco Ortega Menaldo; emerging and political elites like lobbyist Roberto 
López Villatoro and ex-President Alfonso Portillo; and economic elites like the Valdés 
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Paiz brothers and former Interior Minister Carlos Vielman. The commissioner was 
wearing out his welcome. 
Some of these elites tried to apply direct pressure on the government to put the breaks 
on the commissioner. When word spread about the CICIG’s cases against Vielman and 
his former security teams, former President Colom told InSight Crime that Vielman 
himself visited him at his Guatemala City residence and demanded to know why he was 
under investigation. The former minister was accompanied by Juan Luis Bosch, cousin 
of Dionisio Gutiérrez Mayorga, and Fraterno Vila, of the powerful coffee, sugar and 
banking clan, Colom said. Colom told InSight Crime he responded by getting Castresana 
on the telephone. Castresana, according to Colom, told these elites that it was not Colom 
who was investigating Vielman, but the CICIG. 
Others used the media to attack the CICIG. In an editorial published in elPeriódico, ex 
Foreign Minister Edgar Gutiérrez -- formerly one of the strongest advocates of the 
commission, but also a loyal backer of ex-President Portillo -- compared the CICIG to a 
mosquito that “flies above and makes annoying noises that those within its orbit can 
hear. Every once in a while it points (although extracts little blood), but at the half-way 
point of his mandate, most of the cases are only getting half-way (without sentences)”; 
he added that the commission was going after “sardines,” while leaving the “sharks” to 
feast on the Guatemalan state.89 This column, and others that he would write, were 
directed more at Castresana than the CICIG, which he says he has always supported. 
Columnists and university professors joined the chorus. Among them was Pedro 
Trujillo, a former lieutenant colonel in the Spanish military who had worked with 
MINUGUA and is head of the political science department at the traditionally 
conservative (and closely connected to the economic elite) Francisco Marroquín 
University (Universidad Francisco Marroquín - UFM).90 In his columns, published in 
the most widely-read periodical, Prensa Libre, Trujillo argued that the CICIG under 
Castresana was superfluous, ineffective and hypocritical. “What does the CICIG do that 
local investigators can’t do?” he asked in an April 2010 column. “Absolutely nothing.”91 
For her part, Marta Yolanda Díaz-Durán, a columnist at the Siglo 21 newspaper, a radio 
personality and also a professor at UFM, focused on what she called the “reasonable 
doubts” of the Rosenberg case. She argued that Castresana should have never made the 
case public while it was not resolved. “The truth is never provisional,” she wrote in an 
April 2010 column, referring to Castresana’s famous “verdad interina” comment in the 
Rosenberg press conference. “If the premise or the proposition presented does not have 
sufficient evidence (or is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt) it was, and will 
ALWAYS be false.”92 
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Later, she broadened her critique: “What many of the actions taken by the CICIG under 
Castresana’s leadership did was weaken the little institutional strength that was left in 
this country and almost destroyed the right to due process and its central premise: the 
presumption of innocence,” she wrote a few months later.93 
Castresana’s critics were not limited to pundits and academics. In March 2010, several 
former CICIG investigators penned a formal letter to the UN denouncing the 
commissioner. “The commissioner of the CICIG, Carlos Castresana Fernández, has not 
complied with his obligation to promote, without any exceptions [their emphasis], the 
prosecution and sanctioning of illegal bodies and clandestine security apparatuses.”94 
Their complaint focused almost exclusively on the lack of action against the Vielman 
network. They said Castresana had rebuffed prosecutors’ recommendations to bring the 
case to the Guatemalan courts on three occasions.95 
“THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION, NOR DOES THE COMMISSIONER HAVE ANY 
JUDICIAL OR POLITICAL REASONS FOR NOT PUTTING FORWARD THE CASES 
BECAUSE BY NOT DOING SO, HE WAS COMMITTING OMMISION AND SLOWING 
DOWN THE DISMANTLING OF SAID STRUCTURE,” they wrote in capital letters.96 
The campaign against CICIG eventually got personal. Mario David García, the radio host 
who had made the famous Rosenberg video, began a near-weekly tirade against the 
commissioner on his radio show, Hablando Claro. García was more than a journalist. He 
studied at the UFM and later founded the communications department at the university. 
And he has been connected to right-wing political parties stretching back to the 1970s, 
including some with connections to the CIACS ghost Francisco Ortega Menaldo.97 
Among the subjects García broached was that of an alleged affair between Castresana 
and a CICIG employee. By May 2010, Castresana was estranged from his wife, Sanjuana 
Martínez, a renowned Mexican journalist who had reportedly complained to the UN 
about Castresana’s behavior.98 During one transmission of his radio program, García 
pilloried Castresana for his alleged extracurricular activities and gave details of his 
breakup. 
“Sanjuana Martínez Montemayor started to suspect something about the double life of 
her husband at the end of last year each time Castresana traveled to Monterrey to be 
with his family,” he said. “Sanjuana is a seasoned journalist who was able to confirm the 
adultery the first few days of May [2010], which caused a huge emotional impact.”99 
Numerous government and former CICIG investigators told InSight Crime that 
someone sent a package to Martínez in Mexico containing incriminating materials, 
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which allegedly included photographs of Castresana with his mistress.100 Martínez did 
not answer InSight Crime’s requests to talk about the matter, and no such photographs 
have ever been made public. For Castresana’s critics, which included his estranged wife, 
the irony that Castresana’s own “honor” was being questioned made him an easy target. 
“She understands that her husband Carlos Castresana is a public persona who should 
offer honor and moral rectitude that he demands from others,” her spokesperson wrote 
in a statement to García’s radio program, which the host read aloud.101 
The former commissioner’s personal life is germane to this case study because 
numerous people interviewed by InSight Crime speculated that Castresana was being 
blackmailed to keep the lid on certain investigations. However, there is no evidence that 
this was the case. Neither the CICIG nor the UN appeared to have investigated this 
theory, and the majority of those interviewed dismissed it outright. Most said that his 
enemies were simply trying to force him to resign and leave the country. 
And on June 7, Castresana resigned. The reasons, he said in a press conference, were 
multiple and interrelated. To begin with, Castresana cited the smear campaign against 
him, which he said had been orchestrated by at least three different groups, and had 
begun following the arrest of ex-President Portillo in January 2010. However, 
Castresana and the CICIG could only formally accuse one of those groups: the Valdés 
Paiz brothers, who had been involved in the death of Rodrigo Rosenberg. Specifically, 
Castresana said that the Valdés Paiz brothers had hired Rodolfo Ibarra, a public 
relations professional, to use his contacts in the media to undermine the CICIG’s 
investigation against the brothers and vilify Castresana.102 
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At the time, Ibarra was also positioning himself as the spokesman for the Patriotic Party 
(Partido Patriota - PP), the up and coming political coalition that included former 
military general Otto Pérez Molina. His connection to the party sparked rumors that he 
was coordinating the smear campaign with Mario David García -- who would later run 
for president as the PP’s candidate -- and possibly working with Luis Mendizábal, the 
master operator whose clothing boutique served as the headquarters for more than one 
conspiracy to undermine the justice authorities. Mendizábal and García were also still 
seething over the results of the Rosenberg investigation. 
Journalists and academics were also implicated. In phone calls, Ibarra made references 
to meetings with eight “columnists.” Notes from the accused, confiscated by 
investigators, contained the names of several newspaper columnists, including Yolanda 
Díaz-Durán. Other notes mentioned Castresana by name and his weak flanks. 
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“Girlfriend of castresana?” one note asked. “Castresana has other issues, try to verify 
smear his ass,” another read. “Start to attack in the media.” 
Phone intercepts implicated others. The commission presented a series of wiretaps in 
which they recorded Ibarra speaking to Francisco Beltranena, also a professor at the 
UFM, and apparently scheming to undermine the CICIG. (The case against the 
columnists and academics languished in the Guatemalan courts, and Díaz-Durán, 
Trujillo and several others eventually sued a government investigator who did an 
analysis of the media campaign that he gave to the Attorney General's Office and the 
CICIG.) 
“We aren’t talking about made-up stories,” Castresana said. “We are talking about 
smears that were ordered, organized, scheduled in some cases by marketing 
professionals, which attempted to destroy the image of this commissioner because they 
thought -- and they are mistaken -- that by getting rid of this commissioner, they could 
get rid of the CICIG.” 
Castresana (pictured), clearly offended by the 
personal attacks, went further. 
“We are talking about repeated attacks from January 
to now in which they have talked about my improper 
behavior in my personal life that are false and that I 
have to deny,” the commissioner said. 
The commission also alleged that the Valdés Paiz brothers were using Ibarra, as well as 
their brother-in-law and an employee at their pharmaceutical company, to rig the 
selection of new attorney general, Conrado Reyes, who had taken office on May 25, 
2010. In his first two weeks, according to Castresana, Reyes fired employees who had 
worked with the CICIG and replaced them with various functionaries who had been 
removed from their posts due to suspected ties to organized crime; Reyes also took over 
wiretapping operations and began taking over some of the CICIG’s most sensitive cases. 
“Conrado is not the person that the Attorney General’s Office needs,” Castresana 
declared. 
Four days later, after Reyes offered a tepid defense, the Constitutional Court annulled 
his appointment. 
However, Castresana was also finished. His final words in the June 7 press conference 
were representative of his entire period in Guatemala: a mixed bag of ego, martyrdom, 
defiance, and hope. 
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“The dark forces of Guatemala will be without one of their aces in the hole if this 
obstinate commissioner stayed in his post, in spite of his own realization that his day-to-
day presence in his post was sucking the life from the commission and its efforts." 
When a journalist asked him if he was frustrated, he scoffed. 
“Not a single frustration,” he said. “I am very proud of the work that we did… In life, you 
have to know when to stay and you have to when to leave. Thank you very much.”  
And then he walked away from the podium. 
Conclusion: The Problem with Elites 
The CICIG is one of the most important experiments in justice in the region, and, in 
addition to spearheading some of the most important investigations against elites in 
Guatemalan history, it has many lessons that can be applied well beyond the country. 
Perhaps the most of important of these is that there is no such thing as a truly 
independent justice system -- particularly in a country like Guatemala. This stems, in 
part, from the fundamentally human nature of justice, both at the micro level, where 
witnesses provide the core of cases, and at the macro level, where the system has 
become a highly politicized tool of elites, politicians and criminals alike. Judicial actors 
are subject to pressures that range from the personal to the political to the economic. 
Independence is impossible, in part because these judicial actors depend on the same 
networks, political and criminal. The networks might try to manipulate these judicial 
actors, but they also make their work possible. 
Indeed, in Castresana’s case, this network was vital, as it would have been for anyone 
who became the first commissioner of an entity like the CICIG. Its members were his 
sources of information on the structure of the elites and the levers of power within 
government. They were his informants on major cases and often the path to the 
witnesses themselves. They were also a support network for him and for the CICIG. He 
needed them to be his cheerleaders and his interlocutors with the local power brokers in 
order to secure political and -- in the case of the diplomatic community -- economic 
capital, as the embassies were the source of the commission’s funding. CICIG might not 
have survived more than two years without this network. 
Castresana built a broad and varied network, which included members of the traditional 
economic elites such as Alfonso Carrillo, the prominent lawyer with strong ties to the 
CACIF business association; political elites like former Vice President Eduardo Stein; 
social elites such as Helen Mack, the human rights stalwart; supra-elites like diplomats 
from the United States; and more nefarious characters, such as Luis Mendizábal, who 
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operated primarily in the bureaucratic elite world. Depending on who you ask, 
Castresana managed this network with skill, was manipulated by this network, was co-
opted by this network, or a combination of the three. 
Castresana was in a difficult position. In a way, he was forced to play two roles at once: 
that of the canny political operator and that of the staunch prosecutor. As noted, it was 
his choice to play both roles at once, refusing to accept a deputy and shunning, at times, 
the efforts of strong prosecutors. But anyone would have a hard time managing these 
often conflicting tasks, especially in the face of such skilled political and criminal 
operators. The cases analyzed in this study clearly illustrate the challenge. For example, 
in the Vielman cases, Castresana had to constantly weigh how much political capital he 
possessed, and whether he could bring the case to a judicial system that remained weak 
and corrupt. In the Rosenberg and Portillo cases, he had to answer to political as well as 
judicial concerns. And he had to absorb the fallout that came with prosecuting, or not 
prosecuting, these cases. 
If there is one clear recommendation to make from this experience, it is that the CICIG 
might always do better to have a deputy or a political officer at the top to run 
interference for the top prosecutor, shielding them from some of the compromises of 
Guatemala’s politics. 
Castresana also had the unenviable task of establishing the commission’s judicial 
agenda, which was based on a malleable mandate. While the CIACS were its designated 
target, these groups were so broadly defined that it was easy to justify just about any 
case. This poses a problem, in that the commission -- and particularly the commissioner 
-- can select just about any investigation that he or she wants. The chaos this caused was 
evident in the CICIG during its initial phase. After two years, the range of cases being 
investigated by the commission lacked focus. Their targets ranged from drug traffickers 
to CIACS, in the purest sense.103 
Some would argue that this variety is a good thing, illustrating that the commission was 
not simply targeting one type of organized crime -- or type of elites -- over another. But 
within the commission, this wide mandate, and the discretion and reliance on the 
commissioner’s judgment created tension, confusion and misunderstandings. The 
Vielman cases, for instance, caused broad rifts between Castresana and the Costa Rican 
investigator Giséle Rivera that eventually spilled into public view. 
Part of Rivera's and others’ claims about the commissioner are true: Castresana did stall 
and failed to push forward the cases connected to former Interior Minister Vielman, 
especially the Pavón prison case. The CICIG also slowed its investigation into the 
Parlacen murders, and other related cases languished or saw progress slowing to a halt. 
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However, Castresana and the CICIG did not drop the cases, and the amount of work that 
the commission had done on the Pavón case would be evident in the months to come 
when the CICIG formally presented it.104 Giséle Rivera would have us believe that 
Castresana was corrupted by elites like Gutiérrez Mayorga. But the Spanish judge was 
not a nefarious or a corrupt person. He seemed trapped by his decision to depend too 
heavily on one set of elites -- the traditional power brokers from the G8. These elites set 
the rules, not just for Castresana, but for much of Guatemala. Castresana seemed to 
have missed the signs that perhaps he was just one of their pawns in a larger game. But 
while Castresana’s reliance on them undoubtedly corroded his ability to act 
independently, and may have delayed his decision to take action, it did not involve a 
quid pro quo or any pact. 
Castresana also had a near impossible set of tasks as it related to its government 
interlocutors as well. He had to set the tone with the CICIG’s political counterparts and 
key interlocutors in the government -- the executive branch, the Attorney General’s 
Office and the Interior Ministry. Castresana’s office took years to find a balance with the 
Attorney General’s Office, and, as shown by the appointment of Conrado Reyes, this 
balance could be altered in a short span of time. The commission’s relationship with the 
presidency and the ministry were equally shaky. The CICIG saved the presidency of 
Álvaro Colom through the Rosenberg investigation and helped it purge its own staff and 
that of the Interior Ministry, but issues such as alleged corruption at the Banrural 
simmered throughout Castresana’s tenure. In the end, Castresana’s time in the post 
illustrated that the CICIG has to be both an advocate for and a watchdog over the 
government -- a complicated mix for any international body. 
Finally, the commissioner can push certain parts of the mandate more than others. The 
CICIG’s work on the selection process for high-court judges, for example, was largely the 
decision of Castresana. (Subsequent commissioners have stayed away from this fight.) It 
was the correct decision at the time, because it allowed the commission to illustrate that 
core problems needed to be addressed in the selection process in order to make 
wholesale changes to the judicial system. However, this was a messy case, and the 
results represented the lesser of two evils. What’s more, its method -- which relied more 
on public shaming than on legal process -- resembled that of the forces that the CICIG 
was trying to eradicate, and relied on highly charged terms such as “honor,” something 
that would come back to haunt Castresana himself when his own honor came into 
question. 
It was Castresana’s reliance on these somewhat antiquated, class-based notions, and his 
elite network’s subjective and biased evaluations of their enemies, that made him 
vulnerable to criticism in cases like these. This is because those same elites had their 
own interests -- and that of their cohorts -- in mind when they advised him. They also 
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understood that the CICIG operated at the whim of its commissioner and that influence 
with the commissioner was critical for achieving their goals, which at times included 
undermining justice -- or worse. Some of this attempt to manipulate the commissioner 
may have been overt, but other strategies were much more subtle. The near-constant 
presence of elite-linked lawyer Alfonso Carrillo at the commission while the CICIG 
worked to investigate and ultimately influence the selection of high court judges speaks 
to a more understated and sophisticated approach. If Castresana sinned, it was due to 
hubris. Throughout his period, he thought he was in control of the situation. In reality, 
he might have been the one being used.   
In the end, few decisions could placate all of these elite interests. The “provisional truth” 
of the Rosenberg case left many wondering why the CICIG never prosecuted what 
appeared to be remnants of the true CIACS group -- La Montaña -- for their bold 
attempts to destabilize and possibly overthrow the government. Meanwhile, the 
economic elites felt that the commission had failed to put more careful thought and 
consideration into Banrural’s alleged corrupt practices. The Portillo case angered the 
emerging elites and their bureaucratic elite allies, and while Portillo was eventually 
extradited and prosecuted in the US, he served a short prison sentence, making the 
CICIG’s case against him look even more like a political vendetta on the part of the 
economic elites even though the two prosecutions were based on two different charges. 
The Vielman cases are also playing out in foreign courts, leaving Guatemalans with the 
sense that justice in their country will always come in second place. 
If there was anything that could grant the CICIG, and its commissioner, independence 
from these elite power brokers, it was empirical evidence. In this regard, the CICIG 
under Castresana excelled. During his tenure, the commission reformed the laws that 
allowed for wiretapping, and for plea bargain deals with cooperating witnesses, as well 
as improving protection for these witnesses. It oversaw the creation of a special 
investigative unit in the Attorney General’s Office, and began monitoring telephone calls 
and conversations, putting these tools to work. 
The best example of this was the Rosenberg case. The technical aspects of the 
investigation, which was built on triangulating cellular phone signals, phone records 
and other forensic investigative techniques, made an impression on Guatemalans. The 
tradition in the country is to incarcerate only those who are caught in the act or to rely 
on witnesses to build the case.105 Conspiracy trials are played out in the media rather 
than the courtrooms. In the Rosenberg case, CICIG and its Guatemalan counterparts 
followed the phones and the money, rather than the conspiracies that Rosenberg 
himself had handed to the press via his video. In the end, the annals of Guatemalan 
judicial history will be divided into “before the Rosenberg case” and “after the 
Rosenberg case.” 
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But even at its most forensic, justice is not a science. It requires a complicated mix of 
human relationships that stretch from the crime scene to the courtroom, from the 
military barracks to Congress, from the police station to the ballistics lab, from the 
mansions of Guatemala City to the halls of the Attorney General’s Office. Rule of law 
requires more than just good forensic scientists, trustworthy police, honest judges and 
persistent prosecutors. It requires political will from the top -- from those that control 
the means of production, the levers of government power, and the social and intellectual 
construction of the society. In a word, it requires the elites. 
*Dudley is Co-director of InSight Crime and directed the project on elites and 
organized crime. Map by Jorge Mejía Galindo. Graphics by Andrew J Higgens. 
Correction: September 3, 2016 
An earlier version of this story mistakenly said that Adela de Torrebiarte was a vice 
minister under Carlos Vielman before becoming interior minister in 2007. She was the 
first woman to ever hold the job and led an effort to purge the police during her ten 
months in office. InSight Crime regrets the error.  
Correction: September 5, 2016 
An earlier version of this story said that Pedro Trujillo was mentioned in the phone 
intercepts related to the smear campaign case against Carlos Castresana. Castresana, 
in a press conference on June 14, 2010, hinted that Trujillo was mentioned (see press 
conference clip -- minute 5:18 -- 
here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WAo5o9GHaM), but Castresana never 
mentioned Trujillo by name. The earlier version also incorrectly stated that Trujillo 
and others sued the CICIG. They did not sue the CICIG, but rather sued a government 
investigator who had realized an analysis of the press coverage related to the alleged 
smear campaign that he gave to the Attorney General's Office and the CICIG. (See a 
copy of his investigation here:http://www.libertopolis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Dictamen-Pericial-I.pdf) InSight Crime regrets the error.  
Correction: September 7, 2016 
An earlier version of this story said that Dionisio Gutíerrez Mayorga and Juan Luis 
Bosch worked with Victor Rivera Azuaje, a Venezuelan national who helped the 
private sector in kidnapping cases. Although Rivera Azuaje did have an office in a 
building where the family company also has an office, there is nothing to establish any 
working relationship between them. 
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The Huistas 
By InSight Crime* 
 
Introduction – Three Massacres in Huehuetenango 
n the horse racing track known as “Carriles la Frontera” in the Aldea Agua 
Zarca, a border zone in the department of Huehuetenango, a competition was 
taking place between Guatemalan and Mexican horse breeders. Despite being a 
remote area, this was not an unusual event. It was even announced days earlier by the 
radio station K-Buena. 
Among those in attendance were Darío Molina, Walter Montejo and Aler Samayoa, 
three recognized leaders of the “Huistas,” a drug trafficking group associated with 
Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel. None of them had an arrest warrant or an extradition request 
from Guatemalan or US authorities. Their presence at the track was shared by a security 
ring that comprised of three levels of protection around Samayoa and a vast monitoring 
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apparatus that extended to the Pan-American Highway, approximately 20 kilometers 
away. 
The security ring in Cuatro Caminos, a town within the neighboring municipality of La 
Democracia, raised the alarm when it detected the presence of a caravan of vehicles that 
were transporting more than a dozen suspected “narcosicarios” (“narco-hit men”) that 
were planning on assassinating Samayoa so that the Mexican criminal group the Zetas 
could take control of Huehuetenango. 
The Huistas' security apparatus worked. It not only prevented the assassination of their 
leaders, it also neutralized the attackers. Seventeen people were killed in the clash 
between the two groups, although there is speculation there were additional deaths on 
the Mexican side. With this battle, the Huistas consolidated their power, which 
coincided with the decline of a rival local group associated with the Gulf Cartel. 
**** 
Huehuetenango, December 2012. A vehicle carrying a businessman and some 
government officials was ambushed on the night of December 23. The crime scene was 
dramatic: the authorities found the bullet-riddled bodies of the victims in two burned 
cars (pictured), with 200 shell casings littering the ground nearby.1 The dead included 
Luis Antonio Palacios, a local businessman and manager of a luxurious hotel, as well as 
an official with the Attorney General’s Office, a high-level official working on the first 
lady's social programs, and four other individuals. 
Palacios had two partners in the hotel, one of 
whom also worked with him in a coffee export 
business, according to the Guatemalan newspaper 
elPeriódico.2 The hotel, La Ceiba, has two pools, a 
disco and a Jacuzzi. It conducted business as usual 
despite the attack on Palacios. The hotel's 
Facebook page had advertisements announcing a 
New Year’s celebration and other activities through Valentine's Day. 
According to Prensa Libre, the authorities linked Palacios to drug trafficking groups in 
the area and said that one of the burned vehicles had a hidden compartment.3 However, 
neither drugs nor money were found in the car. And there has been no investigation into 
Palacios' activities even though official sources told InSight Crime that he was 
laundering money for Aler Samayoa, alias  "Chicharra," the leader of the Huistas. 
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To be sure, Palacios' death appears to be connected to an internal dispute, according to 
local sources consulted during this investigation. Apparently the hotel and other 
businesses are money laundering fronts for the Huistas, according to sources that did 
not want to be identified for fear of reprisal. It is not clear if the officials that traveled 
with Palacios had links to organized crime, or were simply in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. 
**** 
Six months later, on the night of June 13, 2013, a similar attack took place in a 
municipal building in Salcajá, Quetzaltenango. A caravan of vehicles stopped in front of 
the National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil - PNC) station, where a dozen armed 
men entered and assassinated eight police agents (pictured) and kidnapped a police 
official. 
During its coverage of the attack, Radio Sonora, an 
important national radio station in the country, invited 
its listeners to report the caravan's movements. Between 
8:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. they received calls; some were 
transmitted on air in which the callers said the caravan 
was on the road connecting the municipality of 
Huehuetenango with Mesilla, a small village on the 
border with La Democracia. The callers pointed out that the PNC and the army were not 
taking action against those responsible, laying bare on live radio the links between the 
authorities and the drug trafficking groups operating in the area. 
The kidnapped police officer's body surfaced the following week, and the investigation 
found Eduardo Villatoro Cano had ordered the officers' assassination as a reprisal for a 
“tumbe” (drug robbery).  At that time, Villatoro Cano was an enemy of the Huistas. 
Once this was confirmed, the PNC and the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público 
- MP), with the help of the army, launched an operation involving up to 2,000 officers 
designed to dismantle the group. They captured more than a dozen people, seized 
vehicles, weapons and drugs, and finally managed to have Villatoro Cano arrested in 
Mexico. 
This operation weakened the Huistas' rival group, almost to the point of extinction. It 
also demonstrated that the state security forces could, if given the task, dismantle 
criminal groups by using intelligence and police action. Following Villatoro Cano's 
capture, the question became: Why did the security forces respond quickly and 
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effectively to Villatoro Cano, but there had been no concrete actions taken against the 
Huistas? 
This investigation explores the possible answers to this and other questions about the 
Huistas by investigating the relationships between politics, elites and organized crime in 
the department of Huehuetenango, Guatemala. 
This is our attempt to make public these links, but it should be noted that this is difficult 
territory to investigate. Huehuetenango and its surroundings are in large part a black 
hole with respect to the news and official information. The nucleus of the Huistas is still 
active and maintains influence over state authorities and non-state actors. And the 
majority of the sources for this report preferred to talk on condition of anonymity out of 
fear of reprisal. 
Context -­ Huehuetenango: Between the Communal and the 
Global  
Huehuetenango is a key region for understanding the multiple dimensions of the 
relationships between organized crime, elites and local power groups, communities and 
the state. It is a department in northwest Guatemala, on the border with Mexico. It sits 
adjacent to the departments of San Marcos, Quiché and Totonicapán.  
It is a territory profoundly integrated into global dynamics for at least three reasons: it is 
a border territory, it constitutes a throughway for goods and people, and a lot of 
international migration emanates from the area. 
Since the colonial period, Huehuetenango has been a region on the periphery with 
respect to the Guatemala valley, and as a result, with respect to the political and 
economic dynamics formed there. At the same time, it is an area characterized by its 
commercial and cultural fluidity and by its links to Mexico. Its location on the margins 
of central Guatemala contributed to the consolidation of community identities and the 
development of a certain degree of local autonomy. 
In addition, the department has historically been a throughway for people and goods; 
the archaeological and ethnohistoric evidence shows the presence of objects in 
Huehuetenango that came from various parts of Mesoamerica. What is today considered 
to be contraband has long been a form of work in the area, which is probably a fact that 
has facilitated the operations of today's drug traffickers. It is not a surprise, then, that at 
the end of the 1970s, the residents of various municipalities in Huehuetenango began to 
migrate to the United States. Initially this involved the movement of individuals, but 
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later networks were established that facilitated the transit and placement of the so-
called “Huehuetecos” in the US.4 
While the criminal groups studied in this investigation have links to transnational 
groups, they are profoundly local and have developed a kind of symbiosis with the 
political, social and cultural environment that is shaped in some form by the shared 
history of the region, including the transit of goods and, later, people. The links between 
the criminal groups and political elites in this region also reinforce the the existence of 
“Illicit Political Economic Networks” (Redes político-económicas ilícitas - RPEI), a term 
invented by the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión 
Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala - CICIG) to explain this 
phenomenon.5 The RPEI maintain control over key political positions -- town councils, 
city halls, provincial governments -- that have been used for personal enrichment, as 
well as the construction and consolidation of social bases. Some of the RPEI's activities 
are developed on the margins of the law, which is why it is difficult to establish a clear 
distinction between what is licit and what is illicit. 
Huehuetenango's peripheral nature has also contributed to unique development 
dynamics. The geography has created differences between distinct regions and in some 
cases even within municipalities. Some 79 percent of the population lives in rural areas; 
in some municipalities, this figure reaches over 90 percent. This implies not only the 
dispersion of the population in small towns but also the development of a degree of 
autonomy. According to 2014 statistics, 73.8 percent of the population lives in poverty 
and 28.6 percent in extreme poverty. Fifty-six percent of the population is indigenous, 
and in 18 of 32 municipalities this figure surpasses 90 percent.6 More than a quarter -- 
28.1 percent -- of the population is illiterate. 
The geography, the ethnic diversity, the dispersion of the population and the lack of 
infrastructure enabled the construction of micro-regions in the interior of the 
department that generally have a weak state presence, which permitted the creation of 
unique sociopolitical dynamics. 
This geographical diversity has created in Huehuetenango a “complex network of 
villages” that connect these towns to each other and to Chiapas, Mexico, which has 
enabled cross border commerce that has somewhat reduced the complete dependence 
on agriculture. In the department, there is a very intense relationship between the 
identities of the towns and their geography. The history and geography have contributed 
to the development of a distinct sociopolitical and cultural framework.7 The community 
panorama of Huehuetenango has territories controlled by specific indigenous groups, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime       	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   83	  
areas where multiple 
indigenous groups are 
present, and territories 
occupied by Spanish-
speaking indigenous, known 
as “ladinos.”8 
With the expansion of coffee 
crops, since 1860, the towns 
with fertile soil for coffee-
growing were affected by the 
expropriation of the land 
and subjugation of the work 
force. The owners of coffee 
plantations became local 
elites that controlled the 
political power, the 
economy, and the labor 
market. They are, in effect, 
the principal economic elites 
in the area. Since colonial 
times, their distinct forms of 
social control and labor 
exploitation led to diverse 
strategies of community 
resistance. In addition to armed insurgency and political uprisings, families and 
communities migrated to the mountain and jungle areas in order to escape from forced 
labor.9 With the introduction of the coffee crops, Huehuetenango also became linked to 
the globalized economy, although the organizational structure of means of production 
and the society were not necessarily capitalist. 
The economic, social and political changes triggered by the October Revolution of 1944 
(as it is known in Guatemala) continued despite the US intervention in 1954 that 
toppled president Jacobo Árbenz (for more on this, see introduction). The communities 
that maintained a certain degree of isolation and relative autonomy became increasingly 
linked to the internal market and the national political scene. Economically, the end of 
forced labor and the period of growth that followed World War II resulted in social 
differentiation and economic accumulation.  In several of the border municipalities of 
Huehuetenango, for example, the small-scale contraband of Mexican products became 
not only a subsistence strategy, but also a mechanism of accumulation that would form 
the economic base of some of the emerging elites in the years to come. 
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Nonetheless, the processes of social differentiation, the dispute for local power and the 
confrontation over control of the land became integrated with the insurgent movement 
at the end of the 1970s. During the civil war, especially between 1979 and 1984, the 
department's internal power structure was modified.10 A good portion of the elite 
ladinos in the indigenous communities migrated to Guatemala City and the department 
capital, Huehuetenango, and the power of the coffee landowners began to fade. 
The changes that began in the second half of the 20th century, particularly during the 
October Revolution and the civil war (1960-1996), resulted in these groups losing power 
and the disappearance of the majority of the large plantations. They gave way to small 
and medium-sized properties that are now the principal coffee producers in the 
department. Currently, the businesses interested in exploiting water and mining 
resources, which are mostly multinationals, have made alliances with national and local 
groups to implement their projects, although they face strong community opposition. 
In sum, the power groups -- the predominant farmers and the traditional ladinos -- were 
displaced by the effects of the civil war, since many ladinos opted to migrate to the 
departmental capital or to Guatemala City, and the municipal power changed 
hands.11 These changes provoked, initially, a sort of power vacuum, which was occupied 
by diverse groups. 
This vacuum at first was filled by the army and its paramilitary arm, the Civil Defense 
Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil - PAC).12 For a large part of the 1980s, the head 
of the military in the area assumed the coordination of the public entities in the 
department, and maintained control over the municipalities and the communities via 
the PAC. This situation began to change when the country returned to a democracy in 
the mid-1980s; the demilitarization of the government continued through the peace 
process of the mid-1990s.    
Since the beginning of this century, the local and departmental power structures have 
become more complex, fluid and decentralized. The municipal autonomy and the 
decentralization of functions and resources have enabled both city halls and the very 
communities to exercise control over certain local decisions. For their part, the regional 
power groups have achieved a certain influence in the department and have constructed 
national alliances. Within this context, criminal groups have developed and established 
themselves in some areas of the department. 
Huehuetenango's political elites have been formed within this regional context and in 
interaction with a national political system characterized by the fluidity of its political 
parties. These parties are based on individuals rather than political ideology, and the 
private financing of electoral campaigns. This political system not only has democratic 
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deficits, it has made politics as a whole a form of personal enrichment, in which 
elections permit the people and groups involved to access key positions for their own 
benefit. At the same time, politics has been penetrated by private interests that prevail 
over those of the general public.13 These actors that look to influence the political 
decision-making process range from large multinational corporations and businesses to 
criminal groups.14 
In Huehuetenango it's possible to identify various Illicit Political Economic Networks 
(RPEI) by studying what Jahir Dabroy called the political lineages of the 
department.15 These are family clans that have achieved control over city halls and 
district councils, where they consolidate their political and territorial bases and remain 
entrenched in public office. 
One example is the López Villatoro family. Originally from the municipality of Cuilco, 
the family owns a diverse array of businesses. The López Villatoro family has 
constructed a political network in the southern municipalities of Huehuetenango that 
allows them to exert decisive influence in elections.16 
One family member, Roberto López Villatoro, known as the “Tennis Shoe King,” is 
accused of conducting smuggling operations.17  He is also thought to have influence 
within the judicial system. And while he has been accused of criminal activity in the 
past, none of the allegations against him have led to a successful criminal prosecution.18 
The Huistas, Their Illicit Activities and Their Protection Network 
The diverse and extensive geography, as well as the border location and the constant 
flow of people and goods, create opportunities for 
an array of criminal groups to operate. As 
previously mentioned, the group led by Aler 
Samayoa Recinos (pictured), alias “Chicharra,” 
based in the Huista region, is one of the groups 
operating in Huehuetenango with the most 
autonomy and organizational development. The 
centralized and hierarchical organization 
includes structures specialized in money 
laundering as well as smuggling, storing and 
producing drugs.19 
According to local and national sources, as well 
as prominent politicians in the area who prefer 
anonymity, the basis of the Huistas' illicit activity 
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was established years ago. Since the 1970s, marijuana and poppy have been planted in 
some of the mountainous areas of the department, but these were isolated activities that 
responded to the demand of Mexican intermediaries. It wasn't until the end of the 
20th century that groups like the Huistas developed the capacity to handle the storage 
and transport of drugs into Mexican territory. Initially, these groups were comprised of 
Mexicans who belonged to the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels that had established alliances 
with local groups and who also had experience with contraband and migrant smuggling. 
These groups gradually built their own logistics structures, which permitted them to 
move and store drugs from the capital city, Huehuetenango, all the way to the border. 
The Huistas took their name from the area where the group is based. “Huista” refers to 
San Antonio Huista and Santa Ana Huista, two small municipalities in the department's 
northeast. The group is linked to the Sinaloa Cartel, but little by little it has acquired a 
certain degree of autonomy. It has gone from transshipment to storage and, in the last 
five years, to the production of methamphetamine. The Huistas also developed a 
national strategy, which in addition to providing the group with an infrastructure for 
drug trafficking, has enabled it to build a network of businesses that include: hotels, 
recreation centers, businesses, workshops, construction companies, and even computer 
academies, according to official sources that have investigated the group. All of these 
businesses have allowed the group to not only launder illicit money, but also to establish 
contacts and links with business people, officials and other authorities through 
intermediaries on the local and national level. 
With the intensification of the government’s efforts to fight drug trafficking, the conflicts 
between Mexican cartels and the rise of networks dedicated to “tumbe,” or drug theft, 
security is fundamental to the survival of these criminal groups.  The Huistas, for 
example, have created a sophisticated security apparatus that is designed to protect 
Samayoa and the group's principal leaders from attacks by rival groups and potential 
security operations designed to capture him. It is also intended to protect the group's 
licit and illicit activities, and establish a safety zone in its territory. 
This security system monitors the principal roads, bridges and intersections and 
controls the passage of people and vehicles. It also reports any suspicious movements. 
Once the alarm is raised, the members of the apparatus analyze the potential threat. 
Generally, each “lookout” is comprised of two people: one is on foot and responsible for 
the communication, and the other is on a motorcycle, ready to follow any suspects. The 
investigator of this report observed how these lookouts operated, and on occasion was 
photographed by them. 
This monitoring system is fundamental for the group to maintain territorial security, 
however it is insufficient to shield them from operations by the security forces. That is 
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why in addition to maintaining territorial monitoring, the group has created a network 
of informants within the PNC and the Attorney General’s Office at the local level. 
According to one source,20 the group maintains relationships with commissioners, 
deputy commissioners and police in Huehuetenango and the neighboring department of 
San Marcos, some of whom are on the group's payroll, and provide them with 
information on both police operations and the activities of rival groups. 
The network extends to the judicial system as well. In the local Attorney General’s Office 
there is apparently a flow of information from relatives who work there, as well as 
corrupt officials, who provide the group with information on inquiries or investigations 
against them. At the highest levels, there are allegedly contacts in both the legislative 
and executive branches, which will be explored in the following section. 
The effectiveness of this security system became evident when the group of hit men 
linked to the Zetas tried to ambush the Huistas during the horse race in November 
2008. At that time the Zetas were the most feared criminal group in Guatemala. Its 
strategy was to control territory in order to charge “piso,” or rent, on all of the illicit and 
many of licit activities in the area. That strategy aligned perfectly with its distinctive 
character and military origin: the group's nucleus had defected from Mexico's Special 
Forces. The Zetas also looked for local allies that had the same distinctive character. 
That's how they found Eduardo Villatoro Cano, who employed equally rough and violent 
tactics. 
In March 2008, the Zetas killed Juancho León, the most powerful person in 
Guatemala's underworld at the time. With the help of their allies, the Zetas were taking 
control of eastern Guatemala and its drug corridors. By November 2008, they were 
already eyeing the western half, specifically Huehuetenango. Nonetheless, instead of 
eliminating their enemies, it was the Huistas who ended up leaving over a dozen Zetas 
operators dead.21 As noted, the massacre consolidated the Huistas' power in the area 
and provoked the decline of Villatoro Cano's group. 
The Huistas and Social Control 
Within its territory, principally in the municipalities of Santa Ana Huista and San 
Antonio Huista, the group's security strategy focuses on the construction of a protection 
network and an unwritten rule that punishes informants; and the construction of social 
legitimacy based on the sharing of wealth. The money laundering activities have enabled 
the creation of a network of businesses that offer employment to the residents of the 
municipalities. Participation in the group's various illegal activities has become a sign of 
prestige and a source of aspiration for a large number of youths in the municipalities, 
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who hope to become part of the group. (These same youths form part of the 
aforementioned security networks.) 
On the other hand, the inhabitants of these municipalities know that any comment that 
reveals the group's activities is violently punished. In everyday conversation there is an 
agreement to not talk about “that.” Everyone knows, but no one mentions it, and when 
locals talk with visitors or foreigners, these topics are not discussed. In addition, in the 
towns there is a “zero tolerance” policy towards common crime. The Huistas' security 
groups have assassinated suspected gang members, rapists and criminals in order to 
prevent the presence of rival groups and demonstrate to the communities that their 
presence guarantees them safety. 
The National Civil Police rarely intervenes in these types of situations. In fact, it is 
common knowledge that some of its members are on the group's payroll. Although there 
is a strong police presence on the roads leading to the municipalities of San Antonio 
Huista and Santa Ana Huista, the security agents do not stop the transporters believed 
to be smuggling illicit substances. Indeed, they appear to protect these groups, as they 
exert a strong control over the visitors and strangers who visit the municipalities. 
According to information collected in the field that was informally confirmed by officials 
within the Attorney General’s Office and the General Directorate of Criminal 
Investigation (Dirección General de Investigación Criminal - DIGICI), the Huistas have 
diversified their drug trafficking activities to include the production of 
methamphetamine in their areas of control. Nonetheless, their principal revenue stream 
continues to be the smuggling of cocaine from the Honduras and El Salvador borders, as 
well as from the Pacific coast and Guatemala City, to the Mexican border. The Huistas 
have storage facilities in Huehuetenango, Santa Ana Huista, San Pedro Necta and 
Nentón. 
According to former prosecutors from the Attorney General’s Office that investigated 
drug trafficking activity in Huehuetenango, every week there are drugs being shipped 
from the eastern border, southern coast or Guatemala City into Huehuetenango. 
Caravans of three to five vehicles carry the drugs in hidden compartments inside the 
cars. During these transfers, the security system is in place in order to anticipate 
checkpoints, police operations and the presence of rival groups. 
The group has also been detected using small trucks that are supposedly empty but in 
reality have hidden compartments. These caravans do not stop at checkpoints set up by 
police or MOSCAMED, the agency in charge of eradicating the Mediterranean fruit fly, 
according to the aforementioned sources. An official in the Guatemalan army who asked 
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for anonymity said there is a de facto agreement between the criminal groups and local 
police authorities that permits the drug smuggling operations. 
The drug trafficking routes that begin in Guatemala City pass through Chimaltenango, 
Los Encuentros, Cuatro Caminos,  Huehuetenango and the Gracias a Dios border. An 
alternate route links Cuatro Caminos to Quiché, and from there heads towards the 
border. From the southern coast, the route passes through Zarco, Quetzaltenango, 
Huehuetenango and the border zone. Another possible route goes through Alta Verapaz, 
Baja Verapaz, Uspantán, Cunén, Zacapulas, Aguacatán and Huehuetenango before 
finally arriving at the border.22 All of these routes pass through La Democracia, Santa 
Ana Husita and Nentón, which confirms the existence of drug storage facilities in these 
municipalities. 
In addition to the use of land routes from one border to the next, sections of roads in 
northern Huehuetenango have been identified as runways for drug planes. On the 
outskirts of Nentón, there is a formal runway that is sporadically used. According to 
local informants, the operations are conducted in a matter of minutes; the section of the 
road is illuminated by torches, where the plane lands before the drugs are unloaded into 
four or five pickup trucks. Once this is done, the plane takes off, and the vehicles bring 
their load to the established warehouses. In addition, methamphetamine laboratories 
have been detected in the municipalities of La Democracia, Santa Ana Huista, 
Jacaltenango and Nentón, which, according to officials from the Attorney General’s 
Office and DIGICI, means the storers and transporters are now becoming producers. 
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The Huistas and the Local Economic Elite 
The Huistas' money laundering structure has resulted in the formation of a network of 
businesses that extends into various departments of the country, but the nucleus is in 
Huehuetenango. In this department, the group has been known to make investments in 
real estate, hotels, recreation centers and possibly the cultivation and sale of coffee, 
according to sources in the Attorney General’s Office that have investigated the case. 
These businesses include: the Hotel & Resort La Ceiba on the Inter-American Highway; 
the housing complex Mira al Bosque in Huehuetenango City; the recreation center and 
shopping mall Victoria Center in Santa Ana Huista; the Finca el Sabino in La 
Democracia; and other properties in the departments of Retalhuleu, Izabal and Petén.23 
The manager of Hotel & Resort La Ceiba was Luis Antonio Palacios, who died in the 
2012 Christmas massacre along with six other people. According to the trade register 
consulted at that time by elPeriódico, the hotel was registered under the names of Nery 
López Samayoa (pictured below) and Wilber Alberthony López Castillo.24 According to 
official sources consulted for this investigation, López is a very important part of the 
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Aler Samayoa network, appearing as the owner of several properties and businesses 
belonging to the Huistas. He was also a partner of Palacios in a business called 
Compradores y Exportadores de Café del Bosque (Buyers and Exporters of Coffee of the 
Forest), according to the trade registry consulted by elPeriódico.25 
The contact between the Huistas and Compradores y 
Exportadores shows the interest and possible activity of 
the group in the most important agricultural sector in the 
region. To be a producer and exporter of coffee would not 
be outside the norm for an organized crime group. From 
Honduras to Colombia, the agriculture industry and 
livestock are the best ways to camouflage large capital 
flows and the movement of illicit products. It also serves as 
a way to accumulate political and social capital. 
In the case of the Huistas, it may have even more 
significance. The flight of the large coffee growers in the 
last 30 years has left a power vacuum of elites in Huehuetenango. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the politicians and emerging businessmen are filling that vacuum, 
something which we will cover in the next section. Nonetheless, groups that are 
accumulating capital via illicit means -- whether it be contraband or drug trafficking -- 
also appear to be well-positioned to fill the power void. 
The Huistas appear to be part of the other large industry associated with the emerging 
business class: the hotel sector and shopping malls. Both businesses represent areas 
where it's possible to invest large sums of money without much oversight -- even in 
foreign currencies -- as well as the expansion of social and political networks. For 
example, Hotel & Resort say in their advertisements that staying in the hotel costs 
roughly $200, however the real price is closer to $30, which presents ample possibility 
to manipulate the accounting books.26 
The hotels and shopping malls also appear to be places where it's possible to establish 
networks with authorities, security forces and potential partners. Several official sources 
commented that the hotels are where the parties (with an abundance of alcohol and 
prostitutes) take place in order to earn the trust of members of the Attorney General’s 
Office, the police and the army. “They don't even have to be bribed" with cash, one 
official said.27 
The supposed link between Palacios and the Huistas also provides us a clue about how 
the managers of this important business intersect with certain bureaucratic elites.28 At 
least two of those who were with Palacios on the night of December 23, 2012, were 
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prominent members of the government: one was the prosecutor of the Attorney 
General’s Office and the other was the director of the Secretariat of Social Works of the 
Wife of the President (Secretaría de Obras Sociales de la Esposa del Presidente - SOSEP) 
in the department of El Progreso. 
Lastly, the hotels and the shopping malls give a certain social cache to their owners 
because they represent some of the few public spaces in these areas, spaces that end up 
determining the social activities of the locals. The Hotel & Resort La Ceiba, for example, 
opens its pool to the public on the weekends for a minimal fee. 
The Huistas understand the importance of building social ties and therefore maintain 
very close contact with an individual associated with the local soccer team. As we have 
seen in the other case study, the local soccer team not only represents a common space 
where fans get together, but also a place to build one's networks.29 That same contact on 
the soccer team, for example, is also a frontman for one of the Huistas' businesses and 
was even a mayoral candidate.  
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The Huistas and the Political Elite 
The strongest relationship between the Huistas and the elites appears to be through the 
local politicians. According to three politicians in Huehuetenango, those who exercise a 
substantial amount of power in the Huistas' area of influence are members of this group, 
which is why during electoral campaigns they obey the tacit pact of silence regarding the 
group.  Generally, the mayoral candidates seek to avoid direct and public contact with 
these groups, although the distance is observed in such a way as to avoid conflict with 
them. As previously noted, the security role these groups assume ends up being useful to 
the local authorities, who have one less problem to face. 
Several local sources say that, in certain situations, the Huistas finance some municipal 
activities such as festivals, although on occasion they have helped with payroll, and 
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some infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, this relationship has become tense at times. 
In 2010, to cite just one example, the mayor of La Democracia was assassinated. 
According to one source,30 the mayor was killed because he began to use the town's 
ambulance to transport drugs from Guatemala City to Huehuetenango, and eventually 
tried to act autonomously.31 
At the departmental level, these groups' key relationships, according to several sources, 
are with: the district representatives, the local Attorney General’s Office and the hotel 
association. In addition to information provided by both city and departmental sources, 
elPeriódico has published several articles on the existence of links between the Huistas 
and the representative Emilenne Mazariegos, as well as another individual that has 
worked both in the Attorney General’s Office and as a congressional 
representative. These connections could also serve as interlocutors to manage contacts 
at the highest levels of government. 
The district of Huehuetenango32 happens to be an electoral priority for all parties, 
because of the number of voters, the quantity of representatives that are elected from 
the department, and the number of mayors it has. It is the district with the third-highest 
number of voters, behind the municipalities of Guatemala and its 
surroundings.33 However, political parties are not well organized in 
Huehuetenango,34 since the parties prefer not to legally organize themselves in order for 
the central authorities to be able to name mayoral and representative candidates. 
This district elects 10 of the country's 158 congressional 
representatives.35 Representatives constitute key pieces in the creation of the distinct 
levels of political action because they are integrated into national networks through 
legislative blocs. They also have influence over the decisions that affect their 
department, which enables some of them to be the natural interlocutors with the voters. 
Moreover, they generally have projects in the municipalities and communities. They 
play an important role because they are the players that act with the most autonomy in 
the different spheres of political action, which allows them to help both their 
constituents and financiers. 
At the national level, they can negotiate and influence global public investments, the 
location of certain projects, funds for the departments’ development councils, etc. In the 
departmental arena, congressmen influence the composition and functioning of the 
local bureaucracy, particularly in areas such as health and education, where they insert 
members of their networks as public employees. In the municipalities, they establish 
relationships of reciprocity with local and community groups. In sum, influence over 
congressional representatives equals a large supply of political, social and economic 
capital. 
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The development of the congressional representatives as the nucleus of the 
departmental power groups is relatively recent. One of the results of democratization 
was the weakening of the centralist government and the erosion of the power of the 
presidency. This was complemented by the laws of decentralization and the 
strengthening of the development councils, which awarded the departments with more 
resources, and a certain degree of autonomy to determine their own destiny. This 
contributed to the empowerment of some local actors that, through their control over 
public works (managed by private businesses and independent brokers known in 
Guatemala as non-governmental organizations, or NGOs) and the departmental 
bureaucracy, managed to consolidate power structures. This in turn increased their 
capacity for influence at the national level and, in 
many cases, improved their prospects for illicit 
enrichment. 
The now former Congresswoman Emilenne 
Mazariegos (pictured) is a good example of this 
dynamic between the central powers and local 
politics. She was not born in Huehuetenango, but 
she penetrated the department's political life through her association with the 
representative Edwin Martínez of the Democratic Union (Unión Democrática - UD), a 
party she joined in 2003. In 2007, she ran in the number two position in 
Huehuetenango, making a pact with Martínez -- who she had or had not married, 
depending on the source36 -- that if the party did not win the necessary number of votes 
to elect two representatives, they split time in congress. At first Martínez complied with 
the pact, and after two years he asked Congress permission to hand over his 
responsibilities to Mazariegos.37 Nonetheless, 11 months later, Martínez returned to 
Congress to replace her. There was a public dispute, and Mazariegos was forced to cede 
the office. 
Mazariegos would later return to Congress, but this time with the Patriotic Party 
(Partido Patriota - PP). During her time in Congress, Mazariegos established a close 
relationship with the secretary of the PP and eventual vice president of the country, 
Roxana Baldetti. 
Baldetti is a controversial figure in Guatemala. The former beauty queen and owner of 
beauty salons is a good representation of the new political elite in Guatemala. After 
serving on the public relations team for the presidency at the beginning of the 1990s, 
Baldetti became a candidate and later a congressional representative. Through politics, 
she would consolidate her own private economic empire. During her time as vice 
president (2012-2015) she was repeatedly accused of corruption. She was also believed 
to have been associated with the money laundering structure run by Marllory Chacón, 
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the so-called “Queen of the South,” who was sentenced in the United States on drug 
trafficking charges.38 
In April 2015, the CICIG and the Attorney General’s Office said Baldetti was part of the 
criminal structure that defrauded the customs office.39 Baldetti resigned and she is 
currently in prison while her trial proceeds. This was the beginning of a series of 
corruption cases against representatives, mayors and the highest levels of the executive 
branch including the president himself.  
The political elite was formed though its control over public resources, which were used 
to enrich themselves and remain in positions of power. One of the key institutions for 
understanding this corruption dynamic are the development councils. These kinds of 
councils are where power is built in Guatemala today. The 1985 Constitution established 
that the municipalities would receive 8 percent of the national budget (distributed 
according to the size of the population); this number was raised to 10 percent following 
the peace agreement.40 On top of this was the “executable” revenue for the departments 
that went to public works projects and the operating costs of the departmental 
bureaucracy.41 
The government, which was further weakened by a series of neoliberal reform measures 
in the 1990s, stipulated that public works had to be carried out by private businesses. 
The government did not create a strong regulatory framework, however, and these 
businesses now compete for public funds without proper oversight. In addition, the 
decision of the state to provide certain services through the aforementioned brokers, the 
NGOs, entities that receive public resources, has further weakened the government’s 
hold over the process. 
This resulted in the proliferation of construction companies and NGOs42 that became 
intermediaries in the implementation of public works projects. Generally, these 
businesses or NGOs operate under the control, or in the orbit, of these elites who, in 
exchange for public works concessions, receive commissions and in some cases are part 
of these economic structures. 
This system has turned the public budget into a battleground between political groups, 
construction companies and other state providers.43 The fragmentation and fluidity of 
the party system has resulted in such a situation that when the executive lacks a 
parliamentary majority, it exchanges votes for resources destined for public works, 
which are channeled to businesses in which the representatives have stakes or which 
finance their political campaigns. 
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Political actors are not the only participants in the dispute for public works projects. In a 
systematic manner similar to what has been seen in other countries in Latin America, 
drug trafficking groups have built construction firms that permit them to access public 
funds while also laundering their money and diversifying their business portfolio. 
Guatemala is no exception, as illustrated with the country’s most notable family-run 
drug trafficking groups. To cite just two examples, in the northeast, the Mendoza group 
has builders that have won public work assignments; and in Alta Verapaz, various 
businesses owned by Ottoniel Túrcios -- who until relatively recently was incarcerated in 
the United States -- benefitted from government contracts during the management of 
Obdulio Solórzano -- who was linked to drug trafficking and murder -- and the 
presidency of Álvaro Colom (2008 - 2012). 
The Huistas are no exception. This investigation found that at least one construction 
firm was linked to this group. The company is called Rentas y Servicios Matamoros, 
which is registered under the name of Esteban Danubio Matamoros Castillo. This 
business benefitted from municipal projects44 in Huehuetenango between 2012 and 
2016, according to the website Guatecompras.45 According to the CICIG, Danubio 
Matamoros is an alleged drug trafficker, and authorities have issued a warrant for his 
arrest. He is currently a fugitive from justice.46 
The Huistas' links with the political elite are not limited to the municipal level; they also 
have relationships with representatives and officials within the executive branch. 
Several local sources have said that the group financially backed Emilenne Mazariegos' 
congressional campaign in 2011.47 
Mazariegos denies any type of link to the Huistas, and there are no formal accusations 
against her. Nonetheless, according to a civil society leader in Huehuetenango who 
requested anonymity for security reasons, Mazariegos admitted that she had 4 million 
quetzales (roughly $500,000) to finance her 2011 campaign, a large sum for a local 
election. When she was interrogated by a journalist about the origins of this money, she 
hesitated before saying that it came from her businesses, without providing further 
details.48 She later used a much lower figure, saying that her campaign had 800,000 
quetzales (close to $100,000).49 Mazariegos was re-elected as a representative of 
Huehuetenango in the 2015 elections, but the Supreme Electoral Tribunal declared her 
“unsuitable” due to alleged “influence peddling” with employees of a state health care 
agency.50 
We should emphasize that the two people accusing Mazariegos of having a connection to 
the Huistas are political rivals, as well as a source that works with the government 
intelligence services and another source connected to a local think tank. Mazariegos has 
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not just denied the accusations but, on at least one occasion, has threatened to sue a 
journalist from Plaza Pública who asked about these alleged connections. 
"How can you say that?" she reportedly asked the journalist. "I am going to sue you for 
defamation." 
InSight Crime called two telephone numbers it had for Mazariegos, leaving detailed 
messages on both, and we sent an email asking for her response to these matters. 
However, Mazariegos did not respond to our efforts.   
The case involving the other representative linked to the Huistas is different. Because 
there is less certainty and few sources on this person, InSight Crime is not naming her. 
However, according to information collected by several sources on the ground, we can 
say that this person is from the region and therefore has contacts and relationships with 
these groups. Like in the case of Mazariegos, this person has been accused of receiving 
resources from these groups to finance congressional campaigns, although there are not 
any formal accusations against her.51 
However, an ex-official from the Guatemalan government intelligence services said that 
the rise of this person to Congress was a "huge leap" for the organization in terms of 
their reach and power because "now they have a political operator on the inside ... of 
Congress that is loyal and responds to the interests of the cartel."52 
In addition, former Attorney General’s Office officials say that she still maintains certain 
links with the prosecutor's office as a result of working in Huehuetenango in that office. 
The weakness of the local Attorney General’s Office has forced the prosecutor's office in 
Guatemala City to lead the investigations into organized crime in the region. 
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The Huistas and the Chamalé Group – a Comparison 
In many ways, the Huistas are a typical regional organized crime group. They look for 
alliances that shield them from the law and from their enemies. They look to improve 
their businesses and launder money through investments in local businesses, especially 
those that deal mostly in cash and that can help them camouflage several activities at 
once. They intersect with elites -- above all local political and economic elites -- who can 
serve as interlocutors to political groups at the national level. 
In this sense they are similar to another Guatemalan group that operates in the border 
area with Mexico. The Chamalé group is named after its leader, Juan Alberto Ortíz 
López, alias “Chamalé.” Chamalé was a much more public figure than Samayoa, the 
head of the Huistas. He was a pastor and an open benefactor of political parties and 
candidates. Chamalé was the owner of businesses and NGOs that benefitted directly 
from the economic resources of the state. And he was openly violent within his area of 
operation in the south of San Marcos department, especially in the municipalities of 
Malacatán and Ayutla.  
Both Chamalé and the Huistas also have been identified for having a strong relationship 
with the political parties in power. For his part, Chamalé allegedly provided funds to 
candidates of various parties at both the local and national level so that they would let 
him continue his illicit activities.53 He is also alleged to have had a relationship with 
Gloria Torres, sister of former first lady Sandra Torres. Chamalé (pictured below) 
allegedly negotiated municipal works projects with Gloria Torres,54 although Torres has 
never been prosecuted for these supposed ties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime       	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
www.InSightCrime.org   100	  
This relationship was similar to the one the Huistas seek with representatives: fixers 
who provide access to both local and national power. This is fundamental for the 
Huistas' business interests, especially in terms of security but also for money laundering 
purposes. It also provides a possibility for the group to accumulate political and social 
capital at the local level. 
This type of political support comes from backing candidates with campaign funds. In 
Huehuetenango, all of the information linking organized crime to congressional 
representatives revolves around campaign financing and indirect communication with 
various officials. Nonetheless, as has been previously 
mentioned, concrete evidence does not exist. Based 
on the above information it can be inferred that the 
typical behavior of these groups is to build a circle of 
territorial protection through bribes and cooperation, 
and to establish agreements at the different levels of 
politics in order to achieve a certain degree of security 
for their operations and contributions to economic 
projects. 
Nonetheless, in another sense the Huistas are distinct 
from the Chamalé group. For example, one of the 
peculiarities of the Huistas is their territorial nature. 
The Huistas region is defined by geography and a strong local ladino and indigenous 
identity. There is also a strong connection to the land as well as complex kinship and 
cronyism networks among the mestizos that favor the development of criminal 
structures. 
This unique identity is explained, in part, by the demography and political importance 
of the region. While in the south of San Marcos -- where Chamalé operated -- there is an 
important state presence derived from the area's strategic importance as an 
international commercial hub, the state has a weaker presence in the Huistas’ region. In 
the municipalities of Malacatán and Ayutla, where Chamalé operated, the respective city 
halls led development projects, and there was a strong culture of political activity. 
In the aforementioned municipalities of Huehuetenango, community organizations look 
to meet the local needs and demands. While in the south of San Marcos, the indigenous 
population is a minority, in Huehuetenango, the Huistas municipalities (mainly 
mestizos) are surrounded by indigenous communities that have a strong identity and 
self-organization that contains the expansion and activities of the criminal groups. In 
short, the Chamalé group developed in a politically and economically strategic area, 
while the Huistas established themselves in a relatively marginalized area. 
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In addition, it appears the Huistas do not want to expand their territory nor fight over 
new drug routes. The large clashes this group has engaged in have been in defense of 
their territory rather than attempts at expansion, and although their leaders own 
properties in other departments, they and their families continue to live in Santa Ana 
Huista and San Antonio Huista as well as La Democracia. This has retained their status 
as a local group, which prioritizes the safety of their lives and operations, as well as the 
building of public works projects and the attainment of a certain degree of social 
legitimacy. 
With respect to political links and legal protection, both groups managed to establish a 
strong influence over local authorities. This influence combines bribes to political and 
judicial authorities with distinct forms of interactions with local political leaders. 
Nonetheless, in Chamalé's case, there was cooperation with the municipal authorities in 
Malacatán, especially regarding municipal infrastructure projects. In the Huistas area, 
there seems to be a coexistence based on tolerance rather than cooperation. What’s 
more, there is a strong element of family, or blood-relations, that control key positions 
and facilitate interactions among the various licit and illicit actors. 
In both cases the groups established a degree of social legitimacy, but they did so using 
different methods. Chamalé began in the drug business through his experience as a 
fisherman. Gradually, he built a business emporium that included agriculture and 
ranching activities, cable television channels, construction companies and other legal 
activities that permitted him to build local and regional alliances. He also supported the 
churches in the area and considered himself to be an assistant pastor, which earned him 
social recognition. In a moderate and discreet way, Chamalé began to exhibit luxury 
goods and show them off at local festivals. In the end, he was considered an upstanding 
man, a benefactor and a legitimate businessman. Following his March 2011 capture, 
some workers on his farms protested, demanding his liberty. 
Meanwhile, the Huistas and their leader, Aler Samayoa, have maintained a much lower 
and more localized public profile. The legitimate businesses they have founded are 
principally hotels and a recreation center. Although he’s well-known in the 
municipalities where he operates, since the incident with the Zetas, Samayoa almost 
never appears in public and, according to prosecutors, he has a sophisticated security 
system that has protected him from the authorities. 
Perhaps what separates these groups the most are their respective uses of violence and 
how they maintain order in their areas of operation. According to the United Nations, 
the Chamalé group was responsible for approximately 50 homicides per year in 
Guatemala, and it is involved in extortion and land expropriation. The Huistas, 
according to what InSight Crime has been able to establish, are violent and take action 
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against rivals and possible threats, but they do it outside of their territory in order to 
maintain relative calm and not expose themselves to criminal investigations. In 
addition, as was previously mentioned, the Huistas act against gang members, rapists 
and other criminals; indeed, their areas of operation are among the safest in the entire 
country. 
Conclusion: The Huistas and Their Model of Resistance 
It was the capture of Eduardo Villatoro Cano and the dismantling of his group, which 
had assassinated the police officers as reprisal for a “tumbe” (drug robbery)55 in 2013, 
which laid bare the differences between the Huistas and other criminal groups. The 
Huistas, it appeared, were relatively untouchable. 
Indeed, in addition to the neutralization of Villatoro Cano, between 2010 and 2014 
authorities captured the leaders of numerous Guatemalan drug trafficking groups. This 
includes the capture and extradition to the US of Mauro Salomón Ramírez (captured in 
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October 2010) and Juan Chamalé (captured in March 2011), both of whom operated in 
the country's southwest;  Waldemar Lorenzana Lima (captured in April 2011) and Elio 
Lorenzana Cordón (captured in November 2011), from Zacapa in eastern Guatemala; 
Horst Walther Overdick Mejía (captured in April 2012), from Alta Verapaz; and Jairo 
Orellana Morales, a violent drug trafficker linked the Lorenzana group (captured in May 
2014). As mentioned above, the Zetas group was also dismantled. 
Despite the series of captures of important drug traffickers between 2010 and 2014 and 
the dismantling of the Villatoro Cano group, the Huistas and their leader Aler Samayoa 
“El Chicharra” remain intact. During the weeks-long investigation into the police 
massacre in Salcajá, the Villatoro Cano structure was linked to the Huistas, and 
numerous news articles noted the existence and regional importance of this 
group.56 Nonetheless, at the time of this writing the authorities have not touched the 
Huistas. And, according to local sources, following several weeks of maintaining a low 
profile they have resumed their activities. 
There are a few potential hypotheses -- some of which are complementary -- that can 
explain why the Huistas continue to operate with impunity. These hypotheses are based 
on the field interviews conducted during this investigation. 
The first explanation is that the Huistas count on sufficient political protection to keep 
their leaders immune to investigation and arrest. As was noted in this report, this 
criminal structure could be linked to an important political party via a congressional 
representative. But there are no known investigations in the Attorney General’s Office 
into these ties. What this field investigation was able to confirm was the existence of 
links between this group and local police, some departmental officials and low-level 
officials in the Attorney General’s Office. 
Nonetheless, it's necessary to go further to understand the Huistas' power. Ties to police 
and the Attorney General’s Office did not save their rivals, nor did contributions to 
political campaigns. The Huistas have become the local elite through their economic, 
political and social activities. They are sponsors, benefactors and protectors of the area, 
in both a symbolic but also in a very real sense. They are the ones who make sure that 
other criminals (or those from a parasitic state) do not enter and take advantage of a 
population that has not had a protector for the past 50 years. 
The group's social ties are the key to the second hypothesis. The Guatemalan 
government seems to pursue criminal structures when they cross the accepted limits on 
the use of violence: indiscriminate attacks on civilians; attacks against authorities; or 
armed groups that put into risk the predominance of the security forces, particularly the 
army. According to a former official in the Attorney General’s Office, the Huistas 
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structure constitutes a “village group” that has limited reach and specializes in the 
storage and transport of drugs. And they do not, like the Zetas and Villatoro Cano, rely 
heavily on violence. 
From this perspective, the group's key to survival is due to their apparent decision not to 
leave their comfort zone -- the area where they are based and their established routes; 
their defense of territory; and their very disciplined use of violence in the areas where 
they operate, to the point of controlling the violence and crime committed by other 
criminal groups. This has enabled them to remain out of the crosshairs of the 
authorities, avoid conflicts with rival groups, and maintain control over the region. 
For these reasons, the Huistas were also able to successfully rebuff an attempt by the 
Zetas to occupy their territory. What the Zetas and their local ally, Villatoro Cano, did 
not understand was that their one-dimensional strategy of force could not compete 
against the multidimensional strategy employed by the Huistas. While the Zetas had 
more gunmen and more weapons, the Huistas had the support of the local population 
and important links to the state which gave them legitimacy, economic power and, in 
this case, protection. 
The intervening years have provided more evidence of the effectiveness of the Huistas' 
strategy. The names of their leaders circulate among international and local law 
enforcement agencies, but there are no formal accusations, investigations or extradition 
requests against the Huistas group led by Aler Samayoa. 
*This report was researched and written by a Guatemalan investigator who for safety 
reasons did not want to reveal his/her name. InSight Crime has corroborated the 
information presented in this report. Map by Jorge Mejía Galindo. Graphics by 
Andrew J Higgens. 
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the legal owner and the name of the legal representative of these businesses. This information was 
confirmed by interviewees for the businesses in the Huistas region and La Democracia.  
[24] elPeriódico, “Los negocios de Palacios, quien murió carbonizado en Huehuetenango”, 28 December 
2012. Available at: http://transdoc.com/pagina_interna/25309  
[25] Ibid. 
[26] InSight Crime's researcher investigated on his own the prices for the hotel.  
[27] InSight Crime interview with a high-ranking military official who preferred to remain anonymous, 
Huehuetenango, 31 May 2013. 
[28] Bureaucratic elites make reference ot the elites that depend on their government posts or their 
political seats to gain influence and power.  
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[29] Steven Dudley, "How a Good Soccer Team Gives Criminals Space to Operate", InSight Crime, 11 June 
2014. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/how-a-good-soccer-team-gives-
criminals-space-to-operate 
[30] Information provided by a district representative that preferred to remain anonymous, Guatemala 
City, 15 January 2013; an ex-intelligence official corroborated this information, Huehuetenango, 
departmental capital, 22 January 2013. 
[31]  According to the press agency Centro de Reportes Informativos sobre Guatemala (CERIGUA), the 
assassination of the mayor of La Democracia, Huehuetenango in 2010 was attributed to organized crime. 
See: CERIGUA, “Crimen organizado e intereses personales pintan un panorama electoral sombrío en 
Huehuetenango”, 5 September 2011. Available at: http://cerigua.org/article/crimen-organizado-e-
intereses-personales-pintan-un/ 
[32] The department of Huehuetenango is an electoral district. 
[33] According to statistics from the electoral authorities corresponding to the 2011 elections this district 
represented 7.2 percent of all voters. 
[34] Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), “Partidos Políticos guatemaltecos. 
Cobertura territorial y organización inerna” (Guatemala, 2013). 
[35] In this department during the 2011 elections, voters elected four representatives from the Unidad 
Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), four representatives from the Partido Patriota (PP), one representative 
from the Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN), and one representative from the Partido de Avanzada 
Nacional (PAN). The representational make-up, however, has since been modified: currently the UNE has 
two representatives; the Libertad Democrática Renovada (LIDER) party has three representatives; two 
from the UNE and one from the PAN; one representative from the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca URNG – MAIZ party (a post that had been fraudulently assigned to the PP); and an 
independent representative. 
[36] Luis Angel Sas, “Emilenne recargada”, Plaza Pública, 6 July2011. Available 
at: https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/emilenne-recargada 
[37] Ibid. 
[38] Paola Hurtado, “Marllory Chacón, la reina que abdicó”, Contrapoder, 30 April 2015. Available 
at:http://contrapoder.com.gt/2015/04/30/la-reina-del-sur-marllory-chacon-la-reina-que-abdico/  
[39] Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), “Capturan a Ex Vicepresidenta 
Ingrid Roxana Baldetti Elías y solicitan antejucio contra Presidente Otto Fernando Pérez Molina”, 21 
August 2015. Available 
at: http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=627&cntnt01returnid
=67 
[40] Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales ICEFI, “Guatemala: poder de veto a la legislación 
tributaria y captura fallida del negocio de la inversión pública”, in Política fiscal: expresión del poder de 
las elites centroamericanas (Guatemala, 2015), pp. 25-125. 
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[41] Ibid. 
[42] Historically the NGOs in Guatemala have been involved in promoting development projects and civil 
society initiatives. However, due to a legal loophole, from the 1990s until 2012 NGOs were created that 
served as intermediaries for public resources. Many of these institutions were created by political 
structures to capitalize on public funds. In 2012, the Ministry of Finance prohibited the financing of NGOs 
for public funds.  
[43] See: Steven Dudley, “Justice and the Creation of a Mafia State in Guatemala”, InSight Crime, 15 





[48] Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), “Presentan pruebas contra dos 
ex policías en caso de desaparición forzada”, 11 March 2015. Available 
at: http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=584&cntnt01returnid
=67 
[47] This statement has been made by the Guatemalan newspaper elPeriódico, which has also noted the 
influence of the Huistas within the local police.  
[48] Luis Angel Sas, “Emilenne recargada”, Plaza Pública, 6 July 2011. Available 
at: https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/emilenne-recargada 
[49] Ibid.  
[50] Soy502, “Definitivo: CC deja sin curul a Emilenne Mazariegos y otros diputados”, 4 January 2016. 
Available at: http://www.soy502.com/articulo/hichos-mazariegos-arreaga-chavez-quedan-sin-curul-
segun-cc 
[51] The accusations against this person come from political opponents. There are no formal accusations 
or investigations against him.  
[52] Interview with InSight Crime, January 2013, an ex-member of the Secretary of Intelligence that 
requested anonymity. 
[53] Jorge Dardón and Christian Calderón, “Estudio de caso de la red de Juan Ortíz, alías ‘Chamalé’”, in 
Ivan Briscoe, et al. (editors), Redes Ilicitas y Política en América Latina (Suecia, 2014), p. 232. 
[54] Ibid., p. 234-235. 
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[55] Charles Parkinson, “Mexico Catches Alleged Ringleader of Guatemala Police Massacre”, InSight 
Crime, 4 October 2013. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-catches-
guatemala-police-massacre-leader 
[56] Siglo 21, 21/09/13, p. 4: Trasiego de drogas está en manos de 12 grupos; Prensa Libre, 12/12/13 pg. 
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Project Description 
Elites and organized crime is a multiyear project financed by the International 
Development Research Centre that investigates the dynamics between organized crime 
and elites in four countries: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia.  
For more of this series, go to: www.insightcrime.org 
Disclaimer 
The research presented in this report is not necessarily a reflection of the positions of 
the IDRC. The ideas, thoughts and opinions contained in this document are those of the 
author or authors. 
Team 
InSight Crime Co-director Steven Dudley was the director of the project. Javier 
Meléndez was the project coordinator. Dudley coordinated research in Honduras, along 
with the Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH) 
and the Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa (ASJ). Edgar Gutiérrez coordinated 
research in Guatemala, along with the Fundación DESC. Meléndez coordinated research 
in Nicaragua, along with Expediente Abierto and the Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y 
Políticas Públicas (IEEPP). InSight Crime Co-director Jeremy McDermott coordinated 
research in Colombia. Several independent investigators, who wished to remain 
anonymous, also greatly assisted project work in Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 
Jorge Mejía Galindo developed the maps. Andrew J Higgens did all the graphics. 
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The InSight Crime Foundation 
InSight Crime is a foundation dedicated to the study of the principal threat to national 
and citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean: organized crime. 
We seek to deepen and inform the debate about organized crime in the Americas by 
providing the general public with regular reporting, analysis and investigation on the 
subject and on state efforts to combat it. 
We fulfill this mission by: 
•   providing high quality and timely analysis of news events linked to organized 
crime in the region; 
•   investigating and writing reports on organized crime and its multiple 
manifestations, including its impact on human rights, governance, drug policy 
and other social, economic and political issues; 
•   giving workshops to journalists, academics and non-governmental organizations 
on how to cover this important issue and keep themselves, their sources and their 
material safe; 
•   supporting local investigators through these workshops and by publishing, 
translating and promoting their work to reach the widest possible audience; 
•   developing a region-wide network of investigators looking at organized crime; 
•   presenting in public and closed-door sessions to governments, non-governmental 
organizations, academics and stakeholders on best practices, strategies and 
pitfalls in implementing citizen security policy on the ground. 
For more information, visit: www.insightcrime.org 
Or contact: info@insightcrime.org  
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Copyright 
InSight Crime content follows Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 3.0 
Unported License. 
You are free to: 
•   Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format 
•   Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material 
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms. 
Terms: 
•   Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, 
and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable 
manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.  
•   NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.  
•   No additional restrictions — You may  not apply legal terms or 
technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the 
license permits. 
Notices: 
You do not have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public 
domain or where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation. 
 
